Does Participating in a Collective Decision Affect the Levels of Contributions Provided? An Experimental Investigation

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Does Participating in a Collective Decision Affect the Levels of Contributions Provided? An Experimental Investigation

Author Info

Francesca Bortolami ()
Luigi Mittone ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Luigi Mittone

Abstract

From a purely theoretical perspective, there is no reason to expect that different levels of contributions in public goods games are associated with the same sanctioning/rewarding rule. The efficiency of a norm should be independent of its enactment procedure. On the contrary, multidisciplinary and empirical considerations suggest that individuals may behave differently, according to the level of their direct involvement. The question whether participation in norm enactment results in more contributory gap than when the same norm is received, has not been addressed in public good literature so far. Our three experiments show a behavioural regularity: participating in a normative enactment generates different contributory effects, with respect to the case when the sanctioning norm is merely received.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia in its series CEEL Working Papers with number 0902.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpce:0902

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Via Inama 5, 38100 Trento
Phone: +39-461-882201
Fax: +39-461-882222
Web page: http://www-ceel.economia.unitn.it
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Marco Tecilla).

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2009-03-14 (All new papers)
NEP-CBE-2009-03-14 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
NEP-CDM-2009-03-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
NEP-EXP-2009-03-14 (Experimental Economics)
NEP-HPE-2009-03-14 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
NEP-PBE-2009-03-14 (Public Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Sefton, Martin & Steinberg, Richard, 1996. "Reward structures in public good experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 263-287, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ahn, T K & Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James M, 2003. " Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(3-4), pages 295-314, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers iewwp010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," IEW - Working Papers iewwp299, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," IZA Discussion Papers 2288, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Kosfeld, Michael & Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," Research Memoranda 029, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
- Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Kosfeld, Michael & Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," Discussion Papers 2006-02, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
Josef Falkinger, 2004. "Noncooperative Support of Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Chu, Hong Yih & Li, Wenchuan, 1999. "Free Riding and Consistent Conjectures in the Provision of Public Goods: An Experimental Study," Australian Economic Papers, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(1), pages 26-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2003. "Understanding reciprocity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-27, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Rajiv Sethi & E.Somanathan, 2002. "Understanding reciprocity," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 02-05, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
Andreoni, James, 1995. "Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 891-904, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 153-171, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jean-Robert Tyran & Lars P. Feld, 2005. "Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-17, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jean-Robert Tyran & Lars P. Feld, 2006. "Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-deterrent," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 108(1), pages 135-156, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Michael Kosfeld & Arno Riedl, 2004. "The Design of (De)centralized Punishment Institutions for Sustaining Co-operation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-025/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2004. "When in Rome: conformity and the provision of public goods," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 395-408, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "When In Rome: Conformity and the Provision of Public Goods," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0217, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Ones, Umut & Putterman, Louis, 2007. "The ecology of collective action: A public goods and sanctions experiment with controlled group formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 495-521, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Umut Ones & Louis Putterman, 2004. "The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation," Working Papers 2004-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2007. "The Effect Of Rewards And Sanctions In Provision Of Public Goods," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 671-690, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2006. "The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods," Caepr Working Papers 2006-005, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington, revised Aug 2006. [Downloadable!]
- Martin Sefton & Robert S. Shupp & James Walker, 2005. "The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers 200504, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2005. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS is not the only service displaying RePEc data. Choose on RePEc which service fits your needs best.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.