AbstractHow do wage and other financial benefits affect the set of candidates for political office? In this theoretical paper, we answer the question by studying self-selection into politics of individuals with heterogeneous skills and heterogeneous motivations. Our predictions are in line with the efficiency wage results proposed by the extant literature when a benchmark model with skills as the sole relevant characteristic of individuals is considered. Welfare is increasing in the politicians'wage since the best, i.e., high-skilled, individuals are attracted to politics only if their remuneration covers their high opportunity costs. Our findings are remarkably different when motivation is also taken into account. Welfare is not likely to be maximized when the politicians'wage is relatively high, for high-skilled individuals with market-oriented rather than public-spirited motivation are attracted. Finally, we provide an overview of the labor market of politicians in Europe and suggest that the Italian Parliament might be representative of our inefficiency wage mechanism, which we call moneycracy.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number wp893.
Date of creation: Jul 2013
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Piazza Scaravilli, 2, and Strada Maggiore, 45, 40125 Bologna
Phone: +39 051 209 8019 and 2600
Fax: +39 051 209 8040 and 2664
Web page: http://www.dse.unibo.it
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Private Pensions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-HRM-2013-07-15 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-POL-2013-07-15 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Josse Delfgaauw & Robert A.J. Dur, 2002.
"Signaling and Screening of Workers' Motivation,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
02-050/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 04 Mar 2005.
- Poutvaara, Panu & Takalo, Tuomas, 2004.
IZA Discussion Papers
1195, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997.
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Francois, Patrick, 2000. "'Public service motivation' as an argument for government provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 275-299, November.
- Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2008.
"Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection,"
346, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2013. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives From Selection," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 369-398, 04.
- Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2010. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection," CEIS Research Paper 162, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 28 May 2010.
- Gagliarducci, Stefano & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2009. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection," IZA Discussion Papers 4400, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Klaas J. Beniers & Robert Dur, 2004.
"Politicians’ Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1228, CESifo Group Munich.
- Klaas Beniers & Robert Dur, 2007. "Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 29-54, February.
- Klaas J. Beniers & Robert Dur, 2004. "Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-065/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 Aug 2005.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2004.
"Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4641, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Besley, Tim & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2005. "Competition and incentives with motivated agents," Open Access publications from London School of Economics and Political Science http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Antonio Merlo & Vincenzo Galasso & Massimiliano Landi & Andrea Mattozzi, 2008.
"The Labor Market of Italian Politicians,"
15-2008, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, revised Oct 2008.
- Antonio Merlo & Vincenzo Galasso & Massimiliano Landi & Andrea Mattozzi, 2008. "The Labor Market of Italian Politicians," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 89, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Massimiliano Landi & Antonio Merlo & Vincenzo Galasso & Andrea Mattozzi, 2008. "The Labor Market of Italian Politicians," Labor Economics Working Papers 22461, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Alessandro Fedele & Paolo Naticchioni, 2013.
"Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!,"
BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series
BEMPS08, School of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.
- Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2008.
"Political careers or career politicians?,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 597-608, April.
- Antonio Merlo & Andrea Mattozzi, 2005. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," 2005 Meeting Papers 740, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2007. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6164, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-032, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
- Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2007. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," NBER Working Papers 12921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Heyes, Anthony, 2005.
"The economics of vocation or 'why is a badly paid nurse a good nurse'?,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 561-569, May.
- Anthony Heyes, 2003. "The Economics of Vocation or Why is a Badly Paid Nurse a Good Nurse?," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 03/4, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Dec 2003.
- Benjamin F. Jones & Benjamin A. Olken, 2005. "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(3), pages 835-864, August.
- Francesca Barigozzi & Gilberto Turati, 2012. "Human health care and selection effects. Understanding labor supply in the market for nursing1," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(4), pages 477-483, 04.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson & Daniel M. Sturm, 2010. "Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(4), pages 1329-1352.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luca Miselli).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.