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Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics

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  • Martin J. Osborne
  • Rabee Tourky

Abstract

We study the implications of economies of party size in a model of party formation. We show that when the policy space is one-dimensional, candidates form at most two parties. This result does not depend on the magnitude of the economies of party size or sensitively on the nature of the individuals' preferences. It does depend on our assumptions that the policy space is one-dimensional and that uncertainty is absent; we study how modifications of these assumptions affect our conclusions. (JEL: D70, D72) (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 6 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 (09)
Pages: 974-1005

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Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:6:y:2008:i:5:p:974-1005

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References

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  1. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
  2. Levy, Gilat, 2004. "A model of political parties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 250-277, April.
  3. Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2000. "Meetings with Costly Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 927-943, September.
  4. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
  5. Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 49-87, March.
  6. Gilat Levy, 2004. "A model of political parties," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 540, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  7. Nicolaus Tideman, 1995. "The Single Transferable Vote," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 27-38, Winter.
  8. Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
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Cited by:
  1. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
  2. Oriana Bandiera & Gilat Levy, 2010. "Diversity and the Power of the Elites inDemocraticSocieties: A Model and a Test," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 018, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  3. Eguia, Jon X., 2011. "Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 111-135, September.
  4. Antonio Merlo & Andrea Mattozzi, 2005. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," 2005 Meeting Papers 740, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Ludovic Renou, 2011. "Group Formation and Governance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(4), pages 595-630, 08.
  6. Arnaud Dellis, 2013. "The two-party system under alternative voting procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 263-284, January.
  7. Peeters Ronald & Saran Rene & Yuksel Ayse Muge, 2010. "Strategic Party Formation on a Circle," Research Memorandum 045, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  8. Pech, Gerald, 2012. "Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 14-22.
  9. Jon Eguia, 2012. "A spatial theory of party formation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 549-570, April.
  10. Thomas Braendle, 2013. "Do Institutions Affect Citizens' Selection into Politics?," Working papers 2013/04, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  11. Katsuya Kobayashi & Hideo Konishi, 2013. "Endogenous Party Line," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 848, Boston College Department of Economics.
  12. Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2006. "Mediocracy," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  13. Andrei Gomberg & Francisco Marhuenda & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, 2007. "Endogenous platforms: the case of many parties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 223-249, January.

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