AbstractWe find that two-stage contests could be ineffective, namely, there is a higher chance of low-ability players participating (and winning) than high-ability players. However, imposing a fee on the winner can guarantee that the contest will be effective.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 106 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
All-pay auctions Contests Entry costs;
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