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Congressional Distributive Politics and State Economic Performance

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Steven D. Levitt
James M. Poterba

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Abstract

This paper tests several theories of the effects of congressional representation on state economic growth. States that were represented by very senior Democratic congressmen grew more quickly during the 1953-1990 period than states that were represented by more junior congressional delegations. We find some, but weaker, evidence that states with a high fraction of their delegation on particularly influential committees also exhibit above-average growth. We also test partisan models of distributive politics by studying the relationship between a state's degree of political competition and its growth rate. Our findings support both nonpartisan and partisan models of congressional distributive politics. In spite of our findings with respect to economic growth, we can not detect any substantively important association between congressional delegation seniority, the degree of state political competition, and the geographic distribution of federal funds. The source of the growth relationships we identify therefore remains an open question.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4721.

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Date of creation: Apr 1994
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4721

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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  1. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-63, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Chressanthis, George A & Shaffer, Stephen D, 1993. " Economic Performance and U.S. Senate Elections: A Comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 263-77, March.
  3. Peltzman, Sam, 1990. "How Efficient Is the Voting Market?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 27-63, April.
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  4. Barro, R.J. & Sala-I-Martin, X., 1991. "Convergence," Papers 645, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
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  5. Wright, Gavin, 1974. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(1), pages 30-38, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Gary Hoover & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 95-113, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. J. Ferris & Soo-Bin Park & Stanley Winer, 2008. "Studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 369-401, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2004. "The Allocation of the US Federal Budget to the States: Evidence on the Power of the Purse," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/25, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
  4. W. Robert Reed, 2006. "The Determinants of U. S. State Economic Growth: A Less Extreme Bounds Analysis," Working Papers in Economics 06/05, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. José Bercoff & Osvaldo Meloni, 2009. "Federal budget allocation in an emergent democracy: evidence from Argentina," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 65-83, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Brian Knight, 2004. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 10530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. repec:car:carecp:05-09 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. David S. Lee, 2001. "The Electoral Advantage to Incumbency and Voters' Valuation of Politicians' Experience: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Elections to the U.S..," NBER Working Papers 8441, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Lin, Haixia, 2006. "Natural Amenities, Income Mix, and Endogenous Community Characteristics," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21263, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  10. J Stephen Ferris & Soo-Bin ParkFF & Stanley L. Winer, 2006. "Political Competition and Convergence to Fundamentals: With Application to the Political Business Cycle and the Size of Government," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  11. David Albouy, 2009. "Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds," NBER Working Papers 15224, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Valentino Larcinese & James M. Snyder, Jr. & Cecilia Testa, 2006. "Testing Models Of Distributive Politicsusing Exit Polls To Measure Voterpreferences And Partisanship," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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