This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Lobbying Legislatures

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Morten Bennedsen
Sven E. Feldmann

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We analyze informational lobbying in the context of a multimember legislature that decides on the allocation of a public good. First, we observe that a majoritarian legislature provides widely different incentives for interest groups to lobby than a single decision maker does. Second, we compare a decentralized legislature, such as the U.S. Congress, to a parliament with strong party cohesion. Congress's decentralized nature allows the strategic formation of policy coalitions among high-demand districts and the exclusion of low-demand districts. This increases the incentive to provide information about districts' demand relative to a legislature in which the governing coalition is fixed.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?JPE110402PDF
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: main text
Download Restriction: A link to the University of Chicago Press online edition may require you to be a subscriber to this journal to access the full text, unless the article is not yet subject to access control.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 110 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 919-948
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:4:p:919-948

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637
Fax: (773) 753-0811
Email:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/home.html

Order Information:
Web: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/order1.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Helpman, E. & Persson, T., 1998. "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," Papers 08-98, Tel Aviv.
    Other versions:
  2. Stratmann, Thomas, 1992. "Are Contributions Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 647-64, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-27, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Morten Bennedsen & Sven Feldmann, 1999. "Legislative Structure, Incentives, and Informational Lobbying," Working Papers 9927, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  5. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-64, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Laffont, J.-J., 1999. "Political Economy, Information and Incentives," Papers 99.516, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    Other versions:
  7. Lohmann, Susanne, 1995. " Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 267-84, December.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Cotton, Christopher, 2007. "Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access," MPRA Paper 1842, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Frisell, Lars & Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation," CEPR Discussion Papers 4313, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. John M. de Figueiredo & Charles M. Cameron, 2006. "Endogenous Cost Lobbying: Theory and Evidence," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d05-156, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gawande, Kishore, 2005. "The structure of lobbying and protection in U.S. agriculture," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3722, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Börner, Kira, 2004. "Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia: The Role of Interest Groups in the Case of Access to Medicines," Discussion Papers in Economics 313, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Bugarin, Maurício & Portugal, Adriana & Sakurai, Sérgio, 2008. "Inequality and Cost of Electoral Campaigns in Latin America," Ibmec Working Papers wpe_150, Ibmec Working Paper, Ibmec São Paulo. [Downloadable!]
  7. Hein Roelfsema, 2004. "Legislative Bargaining and Lobbying in the European Union," Working Papers 04-16, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2002. "Lobbying and Legislative Organization The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure," Working Papers 01-2002, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006. "Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure," Working Papers 06.14, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. John de Figueiredo, . "The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis of Structural Policy Windows in the States," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1082, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  11. Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2006. "A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations," CEPR Discussion Papers 5893, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2006. "Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 257-279, March. [Downloadable!]
  13. DAHM, Matthias & PORTEIRO, Nicolas, 2003. "The political economy of interest groups: pressure and information," CORE Discussion Papers 2003057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Portugal, Adriana C. & Bugarin, Maurício, 2007. "Electoral Campaign Financing: The role of public contributions and party ideology," Ibmec Working Papers wpe_100, Ibmec Working Paper, Ibmec São Paulo. [Downloadable!]
  15. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007. "Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty," IDEI Working Papers 493, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  16. Brian Knight, 2005. "Estimating the Value of Proposal Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1639-1652, December. [Downloadable!]
  17. Matthias Dahm & Nicolas Porteiro, 2005. "Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform," Discussion Papers 1408, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Ernesto Dal Bo, 2000. "Bribing Voters," Economics Series Working Papers 039, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc also has a blog.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.