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Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China

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Abstract

We consider the potential influence of contributions from interest groups to political rivals in the voting behavior of US legislators on international trade policy issues. Our application addresses the determinants of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China decision, and focuses particular attention on the agriculture/agribusiness lobby. A simultaneous voting-net contributions model suggests that these contributions were very effective relative to organized labor and other corporate groups, despite their relatively small dollar value. Possible explanations arising from differences in targeting strategies are explored.

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File URL: ftp://repec.bus.usu.edu/RePEc/uth/wpaper/DEFWP2011-02.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Utah State University, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 201102.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 20 Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uth:wpaper:201102

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Postal: 3565 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322-3565
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Fax: 1-435-797-2314
Web page: http://huntsman.usu.edu/economicsandfinance/
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Keywords: Trade policy; agricultural political economy; binary choice models; China;

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