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The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement

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  • Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M.
  • Arnold, Laura W.
  • Zorn, Christopher J. W.

Abstract

A critical element of decision making is the timing of choices political actors make; often when a decision is made is as critical as the decision itself. We posit a dynamic model of strategic position announcement based on signaling theories of legislative politics. We suggest that members who receive clear signals from constituents, interest groups, and policy leaders will announce their positions earlier. Those with conflicting signals will seek more information, delaying their announcement. We test several expectations by examining data on when members of the House of Representatives announced their positions on the North American Free Trade Agreement. We also contrast the timing model with a vote model, and find that there are meaningful differences between the factors influencing the timing of position announcements and vote choice. Our research allows analysts to interpret the process leading up to the House action and the end state of that process.

Suggested Citation

  • Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M. & Arnold, Laura W. & Zorn, Christopher J. W., 1997. "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(2), pages 324-338, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:91:y:1997:i:02:p:324-338_20
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    Cited by:

    1. John Gilbert & Reza Oladi, 2012. "Net campaign contributions, agricultural interests, and votes on liberalizing trade with China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 745-769, March.
    2. Christopher Magee, 2000. "Why Do Political Action Committees Give Money to Candidates? Campaign Contributions, Policy Choices, and Election Outcomes," Macroeconomics 0004038, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Paola Conconi & Giovanni Facchini & Maurizio Zanardi, 2012. "Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 146-189, August.
    4. Eun Jung Cho & Ju Ryum Chung & Ho-Young Lee, 2019. "The Role of Labor Unions in Corporate Transparency: Focusing on the Role of Governance in Auditor Change Process," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(9), pages 1-21, May.
    5. David H. Clark, 2001. "Trading Butter for Guns," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(5), pages 636-660, October.
    6. Michael Becher & Stegmueller, Daniel & Käppner, Konstantin, 2016. "Local Union Organization and Lawmaking in the U.S. Congress," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 304, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    7. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier & Dan Reiter & Christopher Zorn, 2003. "Nonproportional Hazards and Event History Analysis in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 47(1), pages 33-53, February.
    8. William Phelan, 2008. "Why do EU Member States Offer a 'Constitutional' Obedience to EU Obligations? Encompassing Domestic Institutions and Costly International Obligations," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp256, IIIS.
    9. Barros, Carlos Pestana & Passos, Jose & Gil-Alana, Luis A., 2006. "The timing of ETA terrorist attacks," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 335-346, April.
    10. David Darmofal, 2009. "Bayesian Spatial Survival Models for Political Event Processes," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 241-257, January.
    11. David C. King & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1999. "Congressional Vote Options," NBER Working Papers 7342, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Matthew J. Lebo & Will H. Moore, 2003. "Dynamic Foreign Policy Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 47(1), pages 13-32, February.

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