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Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

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  • Paola Conconi
  • Giovanni Facchini
  • Maurizio Zanardi

Abstract

We develop a simple model of trade relations in which legislators with different stakes in import-competing and export industries decide whether to grant fast-track authority (FTA) to the president, giving up the power to amend international trade agreements. We show that strategic delegation motives are key to understanding FTA votes, which involve a decision between alternative country representatives: the executive or the majority in Congress. We then examine the determinants of all votes by US congressmen on FTA since the introduction of this institutional procedure in 1974. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for the predictions of the model.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/137521.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Publication status: Published in: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy (2012) v.4,p.146-189
Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/137521

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Cited by:
  1. James Lake & Daniel L. Millimet, 2014. "An Empirical Analysis of Trade-Related Redistribution and the Political Viability of Free Trade," Departmental Working Papers, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics 1405, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
  2. Giovanni Facchini & Peri Silva & Gerald Willmann, 2008. "The Customs Union issue: Why do we observe so few of them?," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën ces0827, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  3. Conconi, Paola & Facchini, Giovanni & Steinhardt, Max Friedrich & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2012. "The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the US Congress," HWWI Research Papers 136, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
  4. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2013. "Federalism with Bicameralism," Working Papers - Economics wp2013_01.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
  5. Barbara Dluhosch & Nikolai Ziegler, 2011. "The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 325-354, December.
  6. Marco Fugazza & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2010. "The 'Emulator Effect' of the Uruguay Round on US Regionalism," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp0973, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  7. Conconi, Paola & Facchini, Giovanni & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2011. "Policymakers' Horizon and Trade Reforms," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 8561, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Giovanni Facchini & Tommaso Frattini & Cora Signorotto, 2013. "Mind What Your Voters Read: Media Exposure and International Economic Policy Making," Development Working Papers, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano 358, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.

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