Strategic Delegation : An Experiment

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Strategic Delegation : An Experiment

Author Info

Fershtman, C
Gneezy, U

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Chaim Fershtman

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game experiment. Our main concern is to examine the effect of delegation on the way players think about the game and how the play it.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 43-96.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:43-96

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Keywords: GAMES ; STATISTICS;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Fershtman, Chaim & Gneezy, Uri, 2001. "Strategic Delegation: An Experiment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 352-68, Summer.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Robert Ritz, 2005. "Strategic incentives for market share," Economics Series Working Papers 248, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Dufwenberg, M. & Gueth, W., 1997. "Indirect evolution versus strategic delegation : a comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions," Discussion Paper 12, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Güth, Werner, 1998. "Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Working Paper Series 1998:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- M. Dufwenberg & W. Güth, . "Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1997-28, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
Marco Faillo, 2004. "The cost of fair divisions: An experimental investigation of Ultimatum Games with groups," CEEL Working Papers 0402, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
Poulsen, Anders, 2007. "Learning to Make Strategic Moves: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 10927, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Anders U. Poulsen & Michael V. M. Roos, 2009. "Do People Make Strategic Moves? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance," Discussion Papers 09-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Paul Levine & Neil Rickman, 2003. "Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 0603, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 2002. "Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3200, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
John Kagel & Katherine Wolfe, 2001. "Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 203-219, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Wieland Müller & Yossi Spiegel & Werner Güth, . "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Guth, Werner & Muller, Wieland & Spiegel, Yossi, 2006. "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 37-62, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Björn Bartling & Urs Fischbacher, 2008. "Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility," IEW - Working Papers iewwp380, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Björn Bartling & Urs Fischbacher, 2008. "Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility," TWI Research Paper Series 32, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz. [Downloadable!]
Levent Kockese & Efe A. Ok, 2002. "Strategic delegation by unobservable incentive contracts," Discussion Papers 0102-26, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Kockesen, L. & Ok, E., 1999. "Strategic Delegation by Unobservable Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 99-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
- Levent Kockesen & Efe A. Ok, 2004. "Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 397-424, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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