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GATT-think

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  • Bagwell,K.
  • Staiger,R.W.

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

Abstract

In this paper, we present research that speaks to the purpose and design of GATT. The paper proceeds in three basic steps. We first discuss the major theoretical approaches to the study of trade agreements. Next, we develop the institutional context for our study with a description of the history and design of GATT and the WTO. Finally, we draw on the theoretical literature in order to interpret and evaluate the institutional design of GATT.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 19.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:200019

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Andrew K. Rose, 2002. "Do WTO Members have More Liberal Trade Policy?," NBER Working Papers 9347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Paolo Epifani & Juliette Vitaloni, 2003. "GATT-Think with Asymmetric Countries," Development Working Papers 175, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.
  3. Michiel Kok & Richard Nahuis & Albert de Vaal, 2004. "On labour standards and free trade," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(2), pages 137-158.
  4. Limao, Nuno, 2005. "Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 175-199, September.
  5. Rolf J. Langhammer, 2010. "Unordnung in der internationalen Handelsordnung: Befunde, Gründe, Auswirkungen und Therapien," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(1), pages 75-98, 02.
  6. Freund, Caroline, 2003. "Reciprocity in free trade agreements," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3061, The World Bank.
  7. Michael A. Clemens & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2001. "A Tariff-Growth Paradox? Protection's Impact the World Around 1875-1997," NBER Working Papers 8459, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Michael A. Clemens & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2002. "Closed Jaguar, Open Dragon: Comparing Tariffs in Latin America and Asia before World War II," NBER Working Papers 9401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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