This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

GATT-think

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Bagwell,K.
Staiger,R.W. (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/econ/archive/wp2019.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 19.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:200019

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ailsenne Sumwalt).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1997. "Multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 91-123, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C., 2001. "Economic and legal aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation clause," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 233-279, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Feenstra, R.C., 1995. "Estimating the Effects of Trade Policy," Papers 95-10, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
    Other versions:
  4. Robert C. Feenstra & Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1982. "Tariff Seeking and the Efficient Tariff," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 245-262 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  5. McLaren, John, 1997. "Size, Sunk Costs, and Judge Bowker's Objection to Free Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 400-420, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Richard E. Caves, 1976. "Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 9(2), pages 278-300, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1998. "Will Preferential Agreements Undermine the Multilateral Trading System?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1162-82, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1981. "Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 135-53, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Josh Ederington, 2001. "International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1580-1593, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Choi, Jay Pil, 1995. "Optimal tariffs and the choice of technology Discriminatory tariffs vs. the 'Most Favored Nation' clause," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 143-160, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Lapan, Harvey E, 1988. "The Optimal Tariff, Production Lags, and Time Consistency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 395-401, June.
    Other versions:
  12. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1995. "Protection and the Business Cycle," Discussion Papers 1130, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Paul Krugman, 1991. "The move toward free trade zones," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Nov, pages 5-25. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Bond, E. & Syropoulos, C., 1993. "Trading Blocs and the Sustainability of Inter-Regional Cooperation," Discussion Papers 93-17, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    Other versions:
  16. Wilfred J. Ethier, 1998. "Regionalism in a Multilateral World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1214-1245, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Furusawa, Taiji & Lai, Edwin L. -C., 1999. "Adjustment costs and gradual trade liberalization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 333-361, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. John Whalley, 1984. "Trade Liberalization among Major World Trading Areas," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262231204.
  20. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2000. "Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural Trade Disputes," NBER Working Papers 7822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou, 1995. "Product Differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: The Case of the U.S. Automobile Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 891-951, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Collie, David R, 1997. "Bilateralism Is Good: Trade Blocs and Strategic Export Subsidies," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 504-20, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Baldwin, Richard E. & Venables, Anthony J., 1995. "Regional economic integration," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 31, pages 1597-1644 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1999. "Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT," NBER Working Papers 7071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997. "Reciprocity, Non-discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System," NBER Working Papers 5932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  26. repec:att:wimass:199511 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Fernandez, Raquel & Portes, Jonathan, 1998. "Returns to Regionalism: An Analysis of Nontraditional Gains from Regional Trade Agreements," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 197-220, May.
  28. Grossman, Gene & Maggi, Giovanni, 1998. "Free Trade Vs. Strategic Trade: A Peek into Pandora's Box," CEPR Discussion Papers 1784, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  29. Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982. "Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 223-244 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  30. Limao, Nuno, 2005. "Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 175-199, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  31. Brainard, S Lael, 1994. "Last One Out Wins: Trade Policy in an International Exit Game," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(1), pages 151-72, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  33. Steven Berry & James Levinsohn & Ariel Pakes, 1999. "Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 400-430, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  34. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  35. repec:att:wimass:1920011 is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  37. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1998. "The New Regionalism," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1149-61, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  38. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  39. Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1990. "Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 480-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  40. Dan Kovenock & Marie Thursby, 1992. "GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation," NBER Working Papers 4071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  41. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997. "Regionalism and Multilateral Tariff Cooperation," NBER Working Papers 5921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  42. Flam, Harry & Helpman, Elhanan, 1987. "Industrial policy under monopolistic competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1-2), pages 79-102, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  43. Maskin, Eric S & Newbery, David M, 1990. "Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 143-56, March.
  44. Freund, Caroline, 2000. "Multilateralism and the endogenous formation of preferential trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 359-376, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  45. Robert W. Staiger, 1994. "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 4962, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  46. Bhagwati, Jagdish & Greenaway, David & Panagariya, Arvind, 1998. "Trading Preferentially: Theory and Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1128-48, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  47. Devereux, Michael B, 1997. "Growth, Specialization, and Trade Liberalization," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(3), pages 565-85, August.
    Other versions:
  48. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  49. Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-37, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  50. Carmichael, Calum M., 1987. "The control of export credit subsidies and its welfare consequences," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 1-19, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  51. Spagnolo, G., 1999. "Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9913, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  52. Winters, L. Alan, 1996. "Regionalism versus Multilateralism," CEPR Discussion Papers 1525, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  53. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2001. "Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, And International Economic Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 519-562, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  54. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  55. Chisik, Richard, 2003. "Gradualism in free trade agreements: a theoretical justification," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 367-397, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  56. McCalman, Phillip, 2002. "Multi-lateral trade negotiations and the Most Favored Nation clause," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 151-176, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  57. Staiger, Robert W. & Tabellini, Guido, 1989. "Rules and discretion in trade policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1265-1277, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  58. Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 1998. "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 574-601, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  59. Robert W. Staiger, 1994. "A Theory of Gradual Trade Liberalization," NBER Working Papers 4620, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  60. Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 190-214, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  61. R. W. Staiger & G. Tabellini, 1999. "Do Gatt Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(2), pages 109-144, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  62. Gruenspecht, Howard K., 1988. "Dumping and dynamic competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 225-248, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  63. Bond, Eric W & Park, Jee-Hyeong, 2002. "Gradualism in Trade Agreements with Asymmetric Countries," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(2), pages 379-406, April.
  64. Brown, D.K. & Dearorff, A.V. & Stern, R.M., 1993. "International Labor Standards and Trade: A Theoretical Analysis," Working Papers 333, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  65. Kennan, John & Riezman, Raymond, 1988. "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(1), pages 81-85, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Caroline Freund, 2004. "Reciprocity in Free Trade Agreements," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 279, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Andrew K. Rose, 2002. "Do WTO Members have More Liberal Trade Policy?," NBER Working Papers 9347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Paolo Epifani & Juliette Vitaloni, 2003. "‘GATT-Think’ with Asymmetric Countries," CESPRI Working Papers 141, CESPRI, Centre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Mar 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Michiel Kok & Richard Nahuis & Albert de Vaal, . "On labour standards and free trade," CPB Discussion Papers 11, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Nuno Limão, 2002. "Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?," International Trade 0206002, EconWPA, revised 28 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Michael A. Clemens & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2001. "A Tariff-Growth Paradox? Protection's Impact the World Around 1875-1997," NBER Working Papers 8459, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bureau, Jean-Christophe & Salvatici, Luca, 2001. "Agricultural Trade Restrictiveness in the European Union and the United States," Staff General Research Papers 1991, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over 80% of the top 1000 economists are registered on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-6.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.