Advanced Search

The Optimal Tariff, Production Lags, and Time Consistency

Contents:

Author Info

  • Lapan, Harvey E

Abstract

The optimal tariff for a large country equals the reciprocal of the foreign export elasticity of supply. However, if prod uction decisions occur before consumption decisions, the ex ante opti mal tariff is not time consistent because the ex post elasticity is l ess than the ex ante elasticity. The author shows all countries are w orse off if the large country cannot precommit to its ex ante optimal tariff, and that all countries can gain if the large country taxes d omestic production of importables. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 78 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 395-401
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:78:y:1988:i:3:p:395-401

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

For corrections or technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
  1. Mohammad Amin, 2004. "Time Inconsistency of Trade Policy and Multilateralism," International Trade 0402002, EconWPA.
  2. Richard Chisik & Ronald B. Davies, 2004. "Gradualism In Tax Treaties With Irreversible Foreign Direct Investment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 113-139, 02.
  3. William Milberg, 1999. "The Rhetoric of Policy Relevance in International Economics," Macroeconomics 9904009, EconWPA.
  4. K.C. Fung & Robert W. Staiger, 1994. "Trade Liberalization and Trade Adjustment Assistance," NBER Working Papers 4847, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Richard Chisik, 2010. "Limited Incremental Linking and Unlinked Trade Agreements," Working Papers 023, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
  6. Jean-Philippe Gervais, 2001. "Production uncertainty and trade policy commitment," Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21.
  7. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2000. "GATT-Think," NBER Working Papers 8005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1990. "Competition and Human Capital Accumulation: A Theory of Interregional Specialization and Trade," NBER Working Papers 3228, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2012. "Free Trade, Time-Consistent Tariff, and Market Size: The Role of GATT/WTO as Commitment Devices," Discussion Paper Series 79, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jan 2012.
  10. Peter Welzel, 1992. "A note on the time inconsistency of strategic trade policy," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 203-214, June.
  11. Richard Chisik, 2010. "Trade Disputes, Quality Choice, and Economic Integration," Working Papers 022, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
  12. Lapan, Harvey E. & Melkonian, Tigran A., 2002. "Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information," Staff General Research Papers 10026, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:78:y:1988:i:3:p:395-401

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.