The optimal tariff for a large country equals the reciprocal of the foreign export elasticity of supply. However, if prod uction decisions occur before consumption decisions, the ex ante opti mal tariff is not time consistent because the ex post elasticity is l ess than the ex ante elasticity. The author shows all countries are w orse off if the large country cannot precommit to its ex ante optimal tariff, and that all countries can gain if the large country taxes d omestic production of importables. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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Volume (Year): 78 (1988) Issue (Month): 3 (June) Pages: 395-401 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2000.
"GATT-Think,"
NBER Working Papers
8005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2002.
"GATT-think,"
Discussion Papers
0102-39, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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