This paper examines a two-way interaction between trade liberalization and economic growth. Through dynamic increasing returns to specialization, international trade can increase world growth rates. But growth, through specialization , alters patterns of comparative advantage, changing the incentives to levy tariffs in a dynamic tariff game between governments. Two types of equilibria are analyzed. In one, average growth rates are low, tariffs are high and rising, the ratio of exports to income (the trade ratio) is low, and falls to zero asymptotically. In the other, growth rates are high, tariffs are low and falling, the trade ratio is higher, and rises over time. The conditions under which each type of equilibrium will be observed are investigated.
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Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
786.
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2000.
"GATT-Think,"
NBER Working Papers
8005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Other versions:
Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2002.
"GATT-think,"
Discussion Papers
0102-39, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]