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Divided Government and U.S.Trade Policy: Much Ado About Nothing?

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  • Karol, David

Abstract

Scholars assert that divided government impedes the liberalization of U.S. trade policy. They claim that presidents favor freer trade and will use the negotiating authority Congress delegates to them to reach agreements lowering trade barriers. Since presidents gain more support from their congressional co-partisans, less liberalization ensues under divided government. This theory rests on the premise that party is unrelated to congressional trade policy preferences beyond legislators' tendencies to support their presidential co-partisans. Yet before 1970 congressional Democrats were relatively free trading regardless of the president's party affiliation. Since then, the same has been true of Republicans. Divided government facilitates the trade policies of presidents from the protectionist party since they win more support from their “opposition†in this area. Divided government does impede the efforts of presidents from the free-trading party to liberalize. I conclude that divided government has no consistent effect on trade policy outcomes.

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  • Karol, David, 2000. "Divided Government and U.S.Trade Policy: Much Ado About Nothing?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 825-844, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:54:y:2000:i:04:p:825-844_44
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    Cited by:

    1. Paola Conconi & Giovanni Facchini & Maurizio Zanardi, 2012. "Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 146-189, August.
    2. Kim, Chansog (Francis) & Pantzalis, Christos & Chul Park, Jung, 2012. "Political geography and stock returns: The value and risk implications of proximity to political power," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 196-228.
    3. Robert Pahre, 2004. "House Rules: Institutional Choice and United States Trade Negotiations," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(3), pages 195-213, July.
    4. Bowen, T. Renee & Broz, James, 2020. "Designing an International Economic Order: A Research Agenda," CEPR Discussion Papers 15407, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Charles R. Hankla, 2013. "Fragmented Legislatures and the Budget: Analyzing Presidential Democracies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 200-228, July.
    6. Nicole Wu, 2023. "“Restrict foreigners, not robots”: Partisan responses to automation threat," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 505-528, July.

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