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Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much Ado About Nothing?

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Author Info
Karol, David
Abstract

As scholars have turned to domestic politics to explain internationaloutcomes, new puzzles have emerged. One persistent question concerns therole of divided government in the United States. Is liberalizationof U.S. trade policy impeded if different parties control Congress andthe presidency? In recent years students of both international politicaleconomy and U.S. politics have debated this question.Yet despite allthis interest, consensus remains elusive. In an effort to resolve thisissue, I summarize competing perspectives; highlight the questionableassumptions underpinning existing theories; and employ spatial models,statistical analysis, and historical data.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal International Organization.

Volume (Year): 54 (2000)
Issue (Month): 04 (November)
Pages: 825-844
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Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:54:y:2000:i:04:p:825-844_44

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  1. Conconi, Paola & Facchini, Giovanni & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2008. "Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 6790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.


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