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Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

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Author Info
Paola Conconi () (Université Libre de Bruxelles - ECARES and CEPR)
Giovanni Facchini () (University of Milan, University of Essex, LdA, CEPR and CES-Ifo)
Maurizio Zanardi (Université Libre de Bruxelles - ECARES and Tilburg University)

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Abstract

Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions and the implications of this institutional procedure for trade negotiations. We describe a simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across constituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive, while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We show that legislators’ FTA voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their own constituencies as well as those of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the determinants of all FTA votes between 1974 (when fast track was first introduced) and 2002 (when it was last granted) provides strong support for the predictions of our model.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano in its series Development Working Papers with number 246.

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Length: 50
Date of creation: 15 Apr 2008
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Handle: RePEc:csl:devewp:246

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Related research
Keywords: Fast Track Authority; Trade Negotiations; Strategic Delegation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Lohmann, Susanne & O'Halloran, Sharyn, 1994. "Divided government and U.S. trade policy: theory and evidence," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(04), pages 595-632, September. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1981. "Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 135-53, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Segendorff, Bjorn, 1998. "Delegation and Threat in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 266-283, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Glaeser, Edward L. & Ward, Bryce A., 2006. "Myths and Realities of American Political Geography," Working Paper Series rwp06-007, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
  5. Magee, Christopher, 2001. "Administered protection for workers: an analysis of the trade adjustment assistance program," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 105-125, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 2005. "A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 5238, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Putnam, Robert D, 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 42(3), pages 427-60, Summer.
  8. Lohmann, Susanne & O'Halloran, Sharyn, 1994. "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 48(4), pages 595-632, Autumn.
  9. Jones, Stephen R. G., 1989. "Have your lawyer call my lawyer : Bilateral delegation in bargaining situations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 159-174, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Karol, David, 2000. "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much Ado about Nothing?," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 54(4), pages 825-44, Autumn.
  11. Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, 2006. "Myths and Realities of American Political Geography," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 119-144, Spring.
  12. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Robert C. Feenstra & John Romalis & Peter K. Schott, 2002. "U.S. Imports, Exports, and Tariff Data, 1989-2001," NBER Working Papers 9387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Karol, David, 2000. "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much Ado About Nothing?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(04), pages 825-844, November. [Downloadable!]
  15. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June. [Downloadable!]
  16. Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, 2006. "Myths and Realities of American Political Geography," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2100, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  17. Levy, Philip I., 1999. "Lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 345-370, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Giovanni Facchini & Peri A. Silva & Gerald Willmann, 2008. "The Customs Union Issue: Why do we Observe so few of them?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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