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Are Contributions Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees

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Author Info
Stratmann, Thomas

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Abstract

Empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated, meaning that political action committees give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway. Thus, it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior, which is a cornerstone of economic analysis. In this paper, a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of political action committees to vary for different contribution recipients. The author analyzes the behavior of farm political action committees over three election cycles. In contrast to previous findings, he finds that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 100 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 647-64
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:100:y:1992:i:3:p:647-64

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  1. Franklin Mixon & Rand Ressler & M. Gibson, 2009. "False advertising and experience goods: the case of political services in the U.S. senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 83-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Franklin Mixon & Chena Crocker & H. Black, 2005. "Pivotal power brokers: Theory and evidence on political fundraising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 477-493, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. John Lott, 2006. "Campaign finance reform and electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 263-300, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. repec:bep:buspol:9:2007:2:1202-1202 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Peter T. Calcagno & John D. Jackson, . "PAC Spending and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House: An Empirical Extension," Working Papers 4, Department of Economics and Finance, College of Charleston. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2000. "Lobbying Legislatures," Working Papers 07-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. De Figueiredo, John M. & De Figueiredo, Rui J. P. Jr., 2002. "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation," Working papers 4247-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  8. repec:bep:buspol:4:2002:2:161-181 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2007. "Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress," NBER Working Papers 13672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo, 2006. "Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 177-206, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Per Fredriksson, 2001. "How Pollution Taxes may Increase Pollution and Reduce Net Revenues," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 65-85, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  13. repec:bep:buspol:2:2000:1:35-52 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Julio J. Rotemberg, 2000. "Commercial Policy with Altruistic Voters," NBER Working Papers 7984, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Richard Damania & Per Fredriksson & Thomas Osang, 2004. "Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 279-308, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Christopher Magee, 1999. "Why Do Political Action Committees Give Money to Candidates? Campaign Contributions, Policy Choices, and Election Outcomes," Economics Working Paper Archive 292, Levy Economics Institute, The. [Downloadable!]
  17. Hauer, Grant & Runge, C. Ford, 2000. "Transboundary Pollution And The Kuznet'S Curve In The Global Commons," Working Papers 14423, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy. [Downloadable!]
  18. Thomas Stratmann & Francisco Aparicio-Castillo, 2007. "Campaign finance reform and electoral competition: Comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 107-110, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. repec:bep:buspol:2:2000:1:75-88 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Dennis Coates & Bonnie Wilson, 2007. "Interest group activity and long-run stock market performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 343-358, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Christopher Magee, 2000. "Why Do Political Action Committees Give Money to Candidates? Campaign Contributions, Policy Choices, and Election Outcomes," Macroeconomics 0004038, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  22. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2001. "Transactions Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule," ICER Working Papers 04-2002, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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