Does Bill Co-sponsorship Affect Campaign Contributions?: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives, 2000-2008
AbstractThere is considerable variation across members of the United States House of Representatives with respect to the number of bills they co-sponsor each legislative cycle. But we have little understanding of what motivates bill co-sponsorship activity. It seems unlikely that prospective campaign contributors to a specific legislator reward his/her bill co-sponsorship activity per se, as it merely contributes to the productivity of some other member(s) of the legislature. We develop a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model to examine the impact of the number of bills co-sponsored by members of the U.S. House of Representatives on campaign contributions received by those individuals over the time period 2000-2008. Bill co-sponsorship has a large and positive effect on campaign contributions through bill sponsorship.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Auburn University in its series Auburn Economics Working Paper Series with number auwp2011-09.
Date of creation: Aug 2011
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bill cosponsorship; sponsorship; campaign contributions; coalition building; reputational capitol;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-08-15 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2011-08-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
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