From Senators to the President: Solve the lumber problem or else
AbstractWe use key events associated in the two decade-long U.S.–Canada softwood lumber trade dispute to present the dynamic relationship between U.S. Congress and the Administration in the formation of international trade policy. We find that the executive branch of the U.S. government responded quickly to several letters from a group of U.S. Senators demanding a solution to the “lumber problem.” A roll call analysis is used to identify factors influencing Senators’ willingness to sign these letters and pressure the President on behalf of the U.S. lumber industry. The results show that the economic importance of the lumber industry in a Senator’s home state is positively correlated with signatory on these letters and that the presence of a large housing industry in a state makes a Senator less likely to sign these letters. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 123 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
U.S.–Canada softwood lumber dispute; lumber industry; special interest theory; public choice; logrolling;
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