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Endogenous Regulatory Constraints and the Emergence of Hybrid Regulation

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  • Larry Blank
  • John Mayo

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  • Larry Blank & John Mayo, 2009. "Endogenous Regulatory Constraints and the Emergence of Hybrid Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(3), pages 233-255, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:35:y:2009:i:3:p:233-255
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-009-9227-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Blank, Larry Robert, 1996. "Concavity Assumptions in Regulatory Models and the Capital Waste Controversy," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 95-100, January.
    2. Baron, David P., 1989. "Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1347-1447, Elsevier.
    3. David Sappington, 1983. "Optimal Regulation of a Multiproduct Monopoly with Unknown Technological Capabilities," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 453-463, Autumn.
    4. T. Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, 2003. "A Graphical Exposition of the Economic Theory of Regulation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(4), pages 592-606, October.
    5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-1127.
    6. Lyon, Thomas P, 1995. "Regulatory Hindsight Review and Innovation by Electric Utilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 233-254, May.
    7. Littlechild, Stephen, 1988. "Economic Regulation of Privatised Water Authorities and Some Further Reflections," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 4(2), pages 40-68, Summer.
    8. Tracy R. Lewis & David E.M. Sappington, 1989. "Regulatory Options and Price-Cap Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 405-416, Autumn.
    9. Richard Schmalensee, 1989. "Good Regulatory Regimes," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 417-436, Autumn.
    10. Stephen G. Donald & David E. M. Sappington, 1995. "Explaining the Choice Among Regulatory Plans in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 237-265, June.
    11. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    12. Crew, Michael A & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 2002. "Regulatory Economics: Twenty Years of Progress?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 5-22, January.
    13. Caudill, Steven B & Im, Bae-Geun & Kaserman, David L, 1993. "Modeling Regulatory Behavior: The Economic Theory of Regulation versus Alternative Theories and Simple Rules of Thumb," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 251-262, September.
    14. Lyon, Thomas P, 1996. "A Model of Sliding-Scale Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 227-247, May.
    15. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    16. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    17. Thomas P. Lyon, 1991. "Regulation with 20-20 Hindsight: "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose"?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 581-595, Winter.
    18. Weisman, Dennis L, 1993. "Superior Regulatory Regimes in Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 355-366, December.
    19. Sappington, David E. M. & Weisman, Dennis L., 1996. "Revenue sharing in incentive regulation plans," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 229-248, September.
    20. William J. Baumol & Alvin K. Klevorick, 1970. "Input Choices and Rate-of Return Regulation: An Overview of the Discussion," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 1(2), pages 162-190, Autumn.
    21. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    22. Joskow, Paul L. & Rose, Nancy L., 1989. "The effects of economic regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 25, pages 1449-1506, Elsevier.
    23. David E.M. Sappington & David S. Sibley, 1992. "Strategic Nonlinear Pricing under Price-Cap Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    24. Kennedy, Thomas E, 1977. "The Regulated Firm with a Fixed Proportion Production Function," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(5), pages 968-971, December.
    25. Sherman, Roger, 1992. "Capital Waste in the Rate-of-Return Regulated Firm," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 197-204, June.
    26. Noll, Roger G., 1989. "Economic perspectives on the politics of regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 1253-1287, Elsevier.
    27. Joskow, Paul L, 1974. "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 291-327, October.
    28. Ellen M. Pint, 1992. "Price-Cap versus Rate-of-Return Regulation in a Stochastic-Cost Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(4), pages 564-578, Winter.
    29. Liston, Catherine, 1993. "Price-Cap versus Rate-of-Return Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 25-48, March.
    30. Richard A. Posner, 1971. "Taxation by Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 22-50, Spring.
    31. Evans, Lewis & Garber, Steven, 1988. "Public-Utility Regulators Are Only Human: A Positive Theory of Rational Constraints," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 444-462, June.
    32. Crew, Michael A & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1996. "Incentive Regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States: Some Lessons," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 211-225, May.
    33. Leland L. Johnson, 1994. "Toward Competition in Cable Television," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 52751, September.
    34. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jeffrey T. Macher & John W. Mayo & Jack A. Nickerson, 2011. "Regulator Heterogeneity and Endogenous Efforts to Close the Information Asymmetry Gap," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 25-54.
    2. David Sappington & Dennis Weisman, 2010. "Price cap regulation: what have we learned from 25 years of experience in the telecommunications industry?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 227-257, December.
    3. Cambini, Carlo & Meletiou, Alexis & Bompard, Ettore & Masera, Marcelo, 2016. "Market and regulatory factors influencing smart-grid investment in Europe: Evidence from pilot projects and implications for reform," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 36-47.
    4. Meletiou, Alexis & Cambini, Carlo & Masera, Marcelo, 2018. "Regulatory and ownership determinants of unbundling regime choice for European electricity transmission utilities," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 13-25.
    5. Nongluk Buranabunyut & James Peoples, 2012. "An empirical analysis of incentive regulation and the allocation of inputs in the US telecommunications industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 181-200, April.
    6. John W. Mayo & David E. M. Sappington, 2016. "Regulation in a ‘Deregulated’ Industry: Railroads in the Post-Staggers Era," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(2), pages 203-227, September.
    7. Halkos, George & Tzeremes, Nickolaos, 2011. "A conditional full frontier approach for investigating the Averch-Johnson effect," MPRA Paper 35491, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. G. Fellows, 2015. "The capital structure of a firm under rate of return regulation: durability and the yield curve," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 273-299, June.
    9. Laura Abrardi & Cambini Carlo & Rondi Laura, 2018. "The Impact of Regulation on Utilities’ Investments: A Survey and New Evidence from the Energy Industry," De Economist, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 41-62, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Endogenous regulation; Rate-of-return; Profit sharing; L51; L97;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General

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