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A Graphical Exposition of the Economic Theory of Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • T. Randolph Beard
  • David L. Kaserman
  • John W. Mayo

Abstract

This article provides a novel graphical exposition of the economic theory of regulation. In particular, we show--within a single graphical construct--a number of features that emerge from the theory. Through a variety of applications we are able to provide an improved understanding of many questions that have vexed economists, including the markets likely to be chosen for regulation, the propensity of regulatory benefits to be spread across interest groups, the symbiotic nature of regulation and cross-subsidization, and the economics of deregulation. We also are able to depict graphically the relationship between the economic theory of regulation and the traditional normative model of regulation, which assumes that regulators maximize social welfare. (JEL D72, L51) Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • T. Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, 2003. "A Graphical Exposition of the Economic Theory of Regulation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(4), pages 592-606, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:41:y:2003:i:4:p:592-606
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbg030
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Larry Blank & John Mayo, 2009. "Endogenous Regulatory Constraints and the Emergence of Hybrid Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(3), pages 233-255, November.
    2. Walter Hettich & Stanley L. Winer, 2006. "Analyzing the Interdependence of Regulation and Taxation," Public Finance Review, , vol. 34(4), pages 355-380, July.
    3. Eric P. Chiang & Janice A. Hauge, 2007. "Funding Universal Service: The Effect of Telecommunications Subsidy Programs on Competition and Retail Prices," Working Papers 07-08, NET Institute, revised Aug 2007.
    4. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    5. Mark L. Burton & David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, 2009. "Common Costs And Cross‐Subsidies: Misestimation Versus Misallocation," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(2), pages 193-199, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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