Good Regulatory Regimes
AbstractAssuming simple functional forms, numerical methods are used to analyze linear regulatory rules that include cost-plus and price-cap regimes. Regulators are assumed to observe actual cost, but not the disutility of cost reduction, and are assumed unable to impose taxes or make transfers. Best linear regimes depend importantly on the level and form of uncertainty, the regulatory objective function, and the firm profitability constraint. Under uncertainty, regimes in which price depends in part on actual cost generally substantially outperform pure price caps, particularly in terms of consumers' surplus.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 20 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Yoshitaka Fukui & Kyoji Oda, 2012. "Discussion Paper: Who Should Take Responsibility for Unexpected Interest Changes? Lesson from the Privatization of Japanese Railroad System," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 263-278, June.
- Galal, Ahmed & Nauriyal, Bharat, 1995. "Regulating telecommunications in developing countries : outcomes, incentives, and commitment," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 1520, The World Bank.
- T. N. Srinivasan, 2002. "Privatisation, Regulation, and Competition in South Asia," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 41(4), pages 389-422.
- J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers, Utrecht School of Economics 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Zwart, G. & Broer, D.P., 2012.
"Optimal Regulation of Lumpy Investments,"
Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center
2012-020, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Gijsbert Zwart & Peter Broer, 2012. "Optimal regulation of lumpy investments," CPB Discussion Paper, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 214, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Mark Armstrong & David Sappington, 2005.
"Regulation, Competition and Liberalization,"
Industrial Organization, EconWPA
0505011, EconWPA, revised 07 Oct 2005.
- Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
- Harvey James & Derek Johnson, 2002. "Understanding Regulatory Environments and their Impact on Economic Change," Industrial Organization, EconWPA 0202001, EconWPA.
- John E. Kwoka, 1993. "Implementing price cops in telecommunications," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(4), pages 726-752.
- Jeffrey I. Bernstein & David E. M. Sappington, 1998.
"Setting the X Factor in Price Cap Regulation Plans,"
NBER Working Papers
6622, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bernstein, Jeffrey I & Sappington, David E M, 1999. "Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap Regulation Plans," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 5-25, July.
- Ingo Vogelsang, 2006.
"Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-based Regulation,"
The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics,
International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 97-126.
- Ingo Vogelsang, 2005. "Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-Based Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 1474, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.