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The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions

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  • Kevin Grier
  • Michael Munger

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  • Kevin Grier & Michael Munger, 1986. "The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 349-361, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jlabre:v:7:y:1986:i:4:p:349-361
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03179665
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James J. Heckman, 1976. "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models," NBER Chapters, in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 5, number 4, pages 475-492, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1973. "Regression Analysis when the Dependent Variable is Truncated Normal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 997-1016, November.
    3. Crain, W Mark & Deaton, Thomas H & Tollison, Robert D, 1977. "Legislators as Taxicabs: On the Value of Seats in the U.S. House of Representatives," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(2), pages 298-302, April.
    4. Denzau, Arthur T. & Munger, Michael C., 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 89-106, March.
    5. Dougan, William R & Munger, Michael C, 1989. "The Rationality of Ideology," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 119-142, April.
    6. Crain, William Mark & Tollison, Robert D, 1976. "Campaign Expenditures and Political Competition," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 177-188, April.
    7. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    8. Abrams, Burton A & Settle, Russell F, 1978. "The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of Presidential Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(2), pages 245-257, April.
    9. William Welch, 1974. "The economics of campaign funds," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 83-97, December.
    10. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
    11. Uri Ben-Zion & Zeev Eytan, 1974. "On money, votes, and policy in a democratic society," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 1-10, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kevin Grier, 1989. "Campaign spending and Senate elections, 1978–84," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 201-219, December.
    2. Ansolabehere, Stephen & De Figueiredo, John M. & Snyder, James M., 2003. "Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?"," Working papers 4272-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    3. Peter Calcagno & John Jackson, 2008. "PAC Spending and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House: An Empirical Extension," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(25), pages 1-11.
    4. Dana L. Hoag & Thomas G. Field, 1999. "Political and Economic Factors Affecting Agricultural PAC Contribution Strategies," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(2), pages 397-407.
    5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:25:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. James E. Anderson & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Political Market Structure," NBER Working Papers 8371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Michael Munger, 1989. "A simple test of the thesis that committee jurisdictions shape corporate PAC contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 181-186, August.
    8. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    9. Kenneth V. Greene & Phillip J. Nelson, 1998. "Political Party Purpose, Individual Votes, and Political Action Committee Contributions," Public Finance Review, , vol. 26(1), pages 3-23, January.
    10. Joseph P. McGarrity & Daniel Sutter, 2000. "A Test of the Structure of PAC Contracts: An Analysis of House Gun Control Votes in the 1980s," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(1), pages 41-63, July.
    11. Shaun M. Tanger & Richard Alan Seals Jr. & David N. Laband, 2011. "Does Bill Co-sponsorship Affect Campaign Contributions?: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives, 2000-2008," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2011-09, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
    12. Per G. Fredriksson, 1999. "The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization and Environmental Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(3), pages 513-525, January.
    13. Jeffrey Milyo, 1998. "The Electoral Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: A Natural Experiment Approach," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9806, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
    14. Jay Dow & James Endersby & Charles Menifield, 1998. "The industrial structure of the California Assembly: Committee assignments, economic interests, and campaign contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 67-83, January.
    15. Timothy Werner, 2015. "Gaining Access by Doing Good: The Effect of Sociopolitical Reputation on Firm Participation in Public Policy Making," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(8), pages 1989-2011, August.
    16. Philip Hersch & Gerald McDougall, 1988. "Voting for ‘Sin’ in Kansas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 127-139, May.
    17. Tanger, Shaun M. & Laband, David N., 2009. "An empirical analysis of bill co-sponsorship in the U.S. Senate: The Tree Act of 2007," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 260-265, July.
    18. Joseph P. McGarrity & Armand Picou, 2001. "Do Several Winning Coalitions Exist in a State for Senators of the Same Party? Evidence from an Event Study," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 68(2), pages 281-309, October.

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