IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/poleco/v18y2002i2p263-280.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence

Author

Listed:
  • Austen-Smith, David
  • Banks, Jeffrey S.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 2002. "Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 263-280, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:18:y:2002:i:2:p:263-280
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176-2680(02)00080-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Powell, Robert, 1988. "Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(1), pages 155-178, March.
    2. Randolph Sloof, 1999. "Campaign Contributions and the Desirability of Full Disclosure Laws," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 83-107, March.
    3. Baron, David P., 1994. "Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 33-47, March.
    4. Richard Ball, 1995. "Interest Groups, Influence And Welfare," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 119-146, July.
    5. Austen-Smith, David, 1995. "Campaign Contributions and Access," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(3), pages 566-581, September.
    6. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 2000. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 1-16, March.
    7. Epstein, David & Zemsky, Peter, 1995. "Money Talks: Deterring Quality Challengers in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(2), pages 295-308, June.
    8. Lohmann, Susanne, 1993. "A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 319-333, June.
    9. Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, 1996. "Trade Negotiations, Information And Domestic Politics: The Role Of Domestic Groups," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 145-189, July.
    10. Epstein, David, 1997. "An Informational Rationale for Committee Gatekeeping Power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(3-4), pages 271-299, June.
    11. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    12. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-424, June.
    13. Lohmann, Susanne, 1995. "Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 267-284, December.
    14. Austen-Smith David, 1993. "Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-43, January.
    15. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    16. Joseph E. Harrington, 1992. "The Revelation Of Information Through The Electoral Process: An Exploratory Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 255-276, November.
    17. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-292, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May.
    2. Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2006. "Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 257-279, March.
    3. Martin Gregor, 2011. "Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature," Working Papers IES 2011/32, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Nov 2011.
    4. Marianne Bertrand & Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(12), pages 3885-3920, December.
    5. Stadelmann, David & Torrens, Gustavo, 2020. "Who is the ultimate boss of legislators: Voters, special interest groups or parties?," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224562, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
    7. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2013. "Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1862-1890.
    8. Franklin Mixon & Rand Ressler & M. Gibson, 2009. "False advertising and experience goods: the case of political services in the U.S. senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 83-95, January.
    9. Vladimir Karamychev & Bauke Visser, 2017. "Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 813-850, August.
    10. Debraj Ray, 2010. "Uneven Growth: A Framework for Research in Development Economics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(3), pages 45-60, Summer.
    11. Yong-Ju Lee, 2011. "A Game-Theoretic Explanation on Legislative Inefficiency in Korea," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 27, pages 293-309.
    12. Miyamoto, Takuro, 2014. "Taxes versus quotas in lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on abatement costs," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 141-167.
    13. Christian Salas, 2019. "Persuading policy-makers," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 507-542, October.
    14. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Access fees for competing lobbies," Working Papers IES 2014/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2014.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Reuben E., 2002. "Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation," Public Economics 0212001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 1997. "Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-31, February.
    3. Martin Gregor, 2011. "Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature," Working Papers IES 2011/32, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Nov 2011.
    4. Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia & Dewitte, Edgard, 2022. "The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    5. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2020. "Subpoena power and informational lobbying," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 188-234, April.
    6. Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia & Dewitte, Edgard, 2022. "The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    7. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage, 2019. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393084, HAL.
    8. Cagé, Julia & Bekkouche, Yasmine, 2018. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," CEPR Discussion Papers 12614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2017. "Repeated Lobbying By Commercial Lobbyists And Special Interests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1868-1897, October.
    10. Wolton, Stephane, 2016. "Lobbying, Inside and Out: How Special Interest Groups Influence Policy Choices," MPRA Paper 68637, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May.
    12. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Access fees for competing lobbies," Working Papers IES 2014/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2014.
    13. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2022. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03389172, HAL.
    14. Bénabou, Roland & Battaglini, Marco, 2002. "Political Activism, Trust, and Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 3611, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Subpoena Power and Information Transmission," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2017-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    16. Konstantinos Protopappas, 2022. "Optimal lobbying pricing," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 37-61, July.
    17. Susanne Lohmann, 1995. "A Signaling Model Of Competitive Political Pressures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 181-206, November.
    18. Groll, Thomas & Ellis, Christopher J., 2014. "A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 299-316.
    19. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Overlobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    20. Lagerlof, Johan, 1997. "Lobbying, information, and private and social welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 615-637, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:18:y:2002:i:2:p:263-280. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.