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Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and The Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence From The Us Congress

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  • Brian Knight

Abstract

This article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds. In a legislative bargaining model, we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas, and two channels underlie this result. The proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments, and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation. In our empirical analysis, we find that small states, relative to large states, receive more funding in the US Senate, relative to the House. We also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship. Copyright � The Author(s). Journal compilation � Royal Economic Society 2008.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 118 (2008)
Issue (Month): 532 (October)
Pages: 1785-1803

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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:118:y:2008:i:532:p:1785-1803

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  1. > Political Economy > The Political Economy of the US
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Cited by:
  1. Hendriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 729, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  2. Stratmann, Thomas, 2013. "The effects of earmarks on the likelihood of reelection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 341-355.
  3. Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2010. "Why do small states receive more federal money? Us senate representation and the allocation of federal budget," Working Papers 2010/46, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  4. Janne Tukiainen & Tuukka Saarimaa, 2013. "Common Pool Problems in Voluntary Municipal Mergers," Working Papers 53, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
  5. Janne Tukiainen & Tuukka Saarimaa & Hyytinen & Ari, 2013. "Seat competitiveness and redistricting: Evidence from voting on municipal mergers," Working Papers 38, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
  6. Tuukka Saarimaa & Janne Tukiainen, 2013. "Local representation and strategic voting: evidence from electoral boundary reforms," Working Papers 2013/32, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).

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