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Estimating the Value of Proposal Power

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Author Info
Brian Knight

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Abstract

This paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across U.S. congressional districts in 1991 and 1998. The evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models: members with proposal power--those sitting on the transportation authorization committee--secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives. Support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed. I then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior, including partisan models, informational roles for committees, models with appropriations committees, and theories of committees as preference outliers.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 95 (2005)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 1639-1652
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:5:p:1639-1652

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Brian Knight, 2002. "Endogenous Federal Grants and Crowd-Out of State Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the Federal Highway Aid Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 71-92, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2002. "Lobbying Legislatures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 919-948, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Atlas, Cary M, et al, 1995. "Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending Pie: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 624-29, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
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  6. Brian Knight, 2004. "Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power, and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the U.S. Senate," NBER Working Papers 10385, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
  8. Elhanan Helpman & Torsten Persson, 2001. "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(advances/), pages 1008-1008. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Dharmapala, Dhammika, 1999. "Comparing tax expenditures and direct subsidies: the role of legislative committee structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 421-454, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Guillaume R. Frechette & John H. Kagel & Steven Lehrer, 2000. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1515, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  11. Baron, David P & Ferejohn, John, 1987. "Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 303-09, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Larcinese, Valentino & Rizzo, Leonzio & Testa, Cecilia, 2007. "Do Small States Get More Federal Monies? Myth and Reality about the US Senate Malapportionment," MPRA Paper 5339, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Liang, Che-Yuan, 2008. "Collective Lobbying in Politics: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Sweden," Working Paper Series 2008:2, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Valentino Larcinese & James M. Snyder, Jr. & Cecilia Testa, 2006. "Testing Models Of Distributive Politicsusing Exit Polls To Measure Voterpreferences And Partisanship," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  4. Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski Arkadi, 2007. "One-dimensional Bargaining with Markov Recognition Probabilities," Research Memoranda 044, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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