This paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across U.S. congressional districts in 1991 and 1998. The evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models: members with proposal power — those sitting on the transportation authorization committee — secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives. Support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed. I then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior, including partisan models, informational roles for committees, models with appropriations committees, and theories of committees as preference outliers.
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Volume (Year): 95 (2005) Issue (Month): 5 (December) Pages: 1639-1652 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2002.
"Lobbying Legislatures,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 919-948, August.
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Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2000.
"Lobbying Legislatures,"
CIE Discussion Papers
2000-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2000.
"Lobbying Legislatures,"
Working Papers
07-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
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