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Estimating the Value of Proposal Power Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Brian Knight
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This paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across U.S. congressional districts in 1991 and 1998. The evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models: members with proposal power — those sitting on the transportation authorization committee — secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives. Support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed. I then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior, including partisan models, informational roles for committees, models with appropriations committees, and theories of committees as preference outliers.
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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review .
Volume (Year): 95 (2005)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 1639-1652
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:5:p:1639-1652Contact details of provider: Email: Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ More information through EDIRC
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003.
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"Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures ,"
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Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 1999.
"A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice ,"
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1053, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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Chari, V V & Jones, Larry E & Marimon, Ramon, 1997.
"The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 957-76, December.
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Liang, Che-Yuan, 2008.
"Collective Lobbying in Politics: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Sweden ,"
Working Paper Series
2008:2, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
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Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2007.
"Do Small States Get More Federal Monies? Myth and Reality about the US Senate Malapportionment ,"
Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics
07/01, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised May 2007.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Larcinese, Valentino & Rizzo, Leonzio & Testa, Cecilia, 2007.
"Do Small States Get More Federal Monies? Myth and Reality about the US Senate Malapportionment ,"
MPRA Paper
5339, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!] Cecilia Testa, 2009.
"Do Small States Get More Federal Monies? Myth and Reality About the US Senate Malapportionment ,"
Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics
09/04, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London.
[Downloadable!] Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007.
"One-dimensional Bargaining with Markov Recognition Probabilities ,"
Research Memoranda
044, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
David Albouy, 2009.
"Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds ,"
NBER Working Papers
15224, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Valentino Larcinese & James M. Snyder, Jr. & Cecilia Testa, 2006.
"Testing Models Of Distributive Politicsusing Exit Polls To Measure Voterpreferences And Partisanship ,"
STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series
19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
[Downloadable!]
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