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Strategic Delegation and Voting Rules

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  • Bard Hastad

Abstract

When making collective decisions, principals (voters or districts) typically benefit by strategically delegating their bargaining and voting power to representatives different from themselves. There are conflicting views in the literature, however, of whether such a delegate should be "conservative" (status quo biased) or instead "progressive" relative to his principal. I show how the answer depends on the political system in general, and the majority requirement in particular. A larger majority requirement leads to conservative delegation, but "sincere" delegation is always achieved by the optimal voting rule.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1442.

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Date of creation: Feb 2007
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1442

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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
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Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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Keywords: Strategic delegation; collective decisions; voting rules;

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Cited by:
  1. Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2013. "Size versus scope: on the trade-off facing economic unions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 247-267, April.
  2. Barbara Dluhosch & Nikolai Ziegler, 2011. "The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 325-354, December.
  3. Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2013. "Political influence on non-cooperative international climate policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 219-234.
  4. R. Emre Aytimur & Aristotelis Boukouras & Robert Schwager, 2012. "The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control," CESifo Working Paper Series 3900, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2013. "Federalism with Bicameralism," Working Papers - Economics wp2013_01.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.

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