This paper integrates the distributive politics literature with the literature on decentralization by incorporating inter-regional project externalities into a standard model of distributive policy. A key finding is that the degree of uniformity (or ``universalism'') of the provision of regional projects is endogenous, and depends on the strength of the externality. The welfare benefits of decentralization, and the performance of ``constitutional rules'' (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization, are then discussed in this framework.
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Paper provided by Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick in its series CSGR Working papers series with number
10/98.
Length: Date of creation: Aug 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:wck:wckewp:10/98
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