Centralized and decentralized provision of public goods
AbstractWe model the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making over the provision of local public goods. Centralized decisions are made in a legislature of locally elected representatives, and this creates a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions. The legislature can be self-interested or benevolent and this can result in either efficient, excessive or misallocative provision of public goods. Decisions are inuenced by spillover effects and differences in jurisdictionalsize. Furthermore, we look at the incentives for centralization.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 241.
Date of creation: Jul 2008
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More information through EDIRC
decentralization; local public goods;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-07-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2008-07-20 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2008-07-20 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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