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National Borders, Conflict and Peace

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  • Enrico Spolaore

Abstract

This paper reviews the economics approach to conflict and national borders. The paper provides a summary of ideas and concepts from the economics literature on the size of nations; illustrates them within an analytical framework where populations engage in conflict over borders and resources, and may form non-aggression pacts, military alliances, and political unions; and discusses extensions and directions for further research.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15560.

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Date of creation: Dec 2009
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Publication status: published as National Borders, Conflict and Peace in Oxford Handbook of The Economic s of Peace and Conflict , edited by Michelle Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15560

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References

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  1. Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, 2002. "Borders and Growth," NBER Working Papers 9223, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Goyal, S. & Staal, K., 1999. "The political economy of regionalism," Econometric Institute Research Papers, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute EI 9957-/A, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
  3. Enrico Spolaore, 2008. "Civil conflict and secessions," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 45-63, January.
  4. Spolaore, Enrico & Alesina, Alberto, 2006. "Conflict, Defense Spending, and the Number of Nations," Scholarly Articles 4553016, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  5. Bordignon, Massimo & Brusco, Sandro, 2001. "Optimal secession rules," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1811-1834, December.
  6. Enrico Spolaore & Alberto Alesina, 2001. "War, Peace and the Size of Countries," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1937, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  7. Garfinkel, Michelle R., 2004. "Stable alliance formation in distributional conflict," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 829-852, November.
  8. DESMET, Klaus & LE BRETON, Michel & ORTUNO-ORTIN, Ignacio & WEBER, Shlomo, 2006. "Nation formation and genetic diversity," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2006095, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
  10. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1995. "On the Number and Size of Nations," NBER Working Papers 5050, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Wärneryd, Karl, 1997. "Distributional Conflict and Jurisdictional Organization," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics 173, Stockholm School of Economics.
  12. Enrico Spolaore, 2004. "Economic Integration, International Conflict and Political Unions," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, SIPI Spa, vol. 94(5), pages 3-50, September.
  13. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 333-352, August.
  14. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2003. "Global Threats and the Domestic Struggle for Power," Public Economics, EconWPA 0306001, EconWPA.
  15. Ellingsen, Tore, 1998. "Externalities vs internalities: a model of political integration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 251-268, May.
  16. Jos� G. Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2005. "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 796-816, June.
  17. José Garcia Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2004. "Ethnic polarization, potential conflict and civil wars," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 770, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2005.
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Cited by:
  1. Johnson, Noel D & Koyama, Mark, 2012. "Legal Centralization and the Birth of the Secular State," MPRA Paper 40887, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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