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Global threats and the domestic struggle for power

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  • Garfinkel, Michelle R.

Abstract

This paper considers an economy where groups compete in a contest for power to redistribute future income in their favor. An increased external threat of terrorism--either an increase in the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack or a greater loss of income in the event of a successful attack--would tend to reduce the expected value of the contest prize and thus lessen the severity of the conflict at home. However, unless the marginal return from guarding against terrorism is not too large or diminishes at a sufficiently fast rate, such a shock could imply, in equilibrium, both a greater sense of security among the groups against external threats and a greater conflict between them in the domestic struggle for power.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 20 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 495-508

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:20:y:2004:i:2:p:495-508

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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References

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  1. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Garfinkel, Michelle R, 1994. "Domestic Politics and International Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1294-1309, December.
  3. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September.
  4. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
  5. Konrad, Kai A, 2001. "Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages," CEPR Discussion Papers 3050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Grossman, Herschel I., 2002. ""Make us a king": anarchy, predation, and the state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 31-46, March.
  7. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
  8. Jack Hirshleifer, 1991. "The Paradox Of Power," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 177-200, November.
  9. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
  10. Sandler, Todd & Enders, Walter, 2004. "An economic perspective on transnational terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-316, June.
  11. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  12. James A. Robinson, 2001. "Social identity, inequality and conflict," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 85-99, 03.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Enrico Spolaore, 2009. "National Borders, Conflict and Peace," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0744, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  2. S. Brock Blomberg & Gregory D. Hess & Athanasios Orphanides, 2004. "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Terrorism," CESifo Working Paper Series 1151, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Enrico Spolaore, 2012. "The Economics of Political Borders," CESifo Working Paper Series 3854, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Libman Alexander, 2010. "A Small Victorious War: Domestic Revolution and International Conflict," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, December.
  5. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "A small victorious war: political institutions and international conflict," MPRA Paper 17041, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Zaman, Nadeem Uz & Ghutai, Gul & Khan, Kaneez Raza, 2012. "The nature, sources and the socio-economic effects of terrorism in Balochistan," MPRA Paper 37075, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Münster, Johannes & Staal, Klaas, 2005. "War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 75, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  8. Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism," Working Papers 2006-09, FEDEA.
  9. Johannes Münster & Klaas Staal, 2012. "How organizational structure can reduce rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 579-594, March.
  10. Tilman Brück & Bengt-Arne Wickström, 2004. "The Economic Consequences of Terror: A Brief Survey," HiCN Working Papers 03, Households in Conflict Network.
  11. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах
    [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION O
    ," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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