This paper studies secessions as the outcome of conflict between regions. We study under what conditions regions will divert costly resources to fight each other over political borders. We derive the probability of secession and the amount of resources diverted to separatist conflict, and show how those variables depend on factors such as heterogeneity costs, economies of scale, relative size, and external threats. We also model civil conflict over types of government, after borders have been determined, and study how this political conflict affects the incentives to secede.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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Other versions:
Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2008.
"Persuasion as a Contest,"
Economics Series
2008_07, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
[Downloadable!]
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, 2009.
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