Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Economic Integration, International Conflict and Political Unions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Enrico Spolaore

    ()
    (Tufts University, Medford (MA - USA))

Abstract

This article studies the interactions among economic integration, international conflict, and the formation and breakup of political unions. Economic integration reduces the importance of political size, while international conflict increases it. When international conflict reduces economic integration between politically separate units, multiple equilibria are possible. In one equilibrium, political units are small and more open and engage less in conflict, therefore making political size less important. In another equilibrium, the world is formed by larger units, with more conflict and less economic integration

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.rivistapoliticaeconomica.it/2004/set-ot/Spolaore.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by SIPI Spa in its journal Rivista di Politica Economica.

Volume (Year): 94 (2004)
Issue (Month): 5 (September-October)
Pages: 3-50

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:94:y:2004:i:5:p:3-50

Contact details of provider:

Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. James E. Anderson, 1999. "Why Do Nations Trade (So Little)?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 428, Boston College Department of Economics.
  2. Engel, Charles & Rogers, John H, 1996. "How Wide Is the Border?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1112-25, December.
  3. Alberto F. Ades & Edward L. Glaeser, 1999. "Evidence On Growth, Increasing Returns, And The Extent Of The Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 1025-1045, August.
  4. Anderson, James E. & Marcouiller, S.J. Douglas, 1997. "Trade and Security, I: Anarchy," Working Paper Series 477, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  5. Thompson, Earl A, 1974. "Taxation and National Defense," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 755-82, July/Aug..
  6. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 1995. "Togetheror separately? Issues on the costs and benefits of political and fiscal unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 751-758, April.
  7. Brito, Dagobert L. & Intriligator, Michael D., 1995. "Arms races and proliferation," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 109-164 Elsevier.
  8. Smith, Ron, 1995. "The demand for military expenditure," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 69-87 Elsevier.
  9. Murdoch, James C., 1995. "Military alliances: Theory and empirics," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 89-108 Elsevier.
  10. McCallum, John, 1995. "National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 615-23, June.
  11. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 1998. "The Regionalization of the World Economy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number fran98-1.
  12. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September.
  13. Anderton, Charles H., 1995. "Economics of arms trade," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 523-561 Elsevier.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Raul Caruso, 2008. "Reciprocity in the shadow of threat," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 91-111, April.
  2. Vincent Vicard, 2006. "Trade, Conflicts, and Political Integration: the Regional Interplays," CESifo Working Paper Series 1839, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Raul Caruso, 2007. "Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A note," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(17), pages 1-8.
  4. Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, 2012. "War and Relatedness," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0769, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  5. Alessandro Romagnoli & Luisa Mengoni, 2009. "The challenge of economic integration in the MENA region: from GAFTA and EU-MFTA to small scale Arab Unions," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 69-83, May.
  6. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах
    [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION O
    ," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Zuleta, Hernando & Villaveces, Marta Juanita & Andonova, Veneta, 2013. "Conflict and negotiation in Colombia: Are pre-donations useful?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 105-117.
  8. Caruso, Raul, 2007. "A Tentative Model of Conflict, Appropriation and Production in a two-sector Economy," MPRA Paper 4053, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Caruso, Raul, 2006. "Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes,(The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game)," MPRA Paper 214, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2006.
  10. Enrico Spolaore, 2009. "National Borders, Conflict and Peace," NBER Working Papers 15560, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:94:y:2004:i:5:p:3-50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sabrina Marino).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.