This paper presents a model of conflict in an economy characterized by two sectors. In a first sector labelled as contested sector two agents struggle in order to appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In a second sector, the uncontested sector, each agent holds secure property rights over the production of some goods. Both agents maximize an income function which can be described as a function of contributions of both sectors. Results show that the degree of returns in the uncontested sector is a powerful force which countervails the impact of destructive and unproductive interaction in the contested sector.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
4053.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances F51 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006.
"Economics of Conflict: An Overview,"
Working Papers
050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
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