A Tentative Model of Conflict, Appropriation and Production in a two-sector Economy
AbstractThis paper presents a model of conflict in an economy characterized by two sectors. In a first sector labelled as contested sector two agents struggle in order to appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In a second sector, the uncontested sector, each agent holds secure property rights over the production of some goods. Both agents maximize an income function which can be described as a function of contributions of both sectors. Results show that the degree of returns in the uncontested sector is a powerful force which countervails the impact of destructive and unproductive interaction in the contested sector.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 4053.
Date of creation: Jul 2007
Date of revision:
Conflict; Productive and Unproductive Activities; Butter and Guns; Crime; Warlords; Civil War;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
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