Mutual Raiding of Production and the Emergence of Exchange

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Mutual Raiding of Production and the Emergence of Exchange

Author Info

Kjell Hausken

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Kjell Hausken

Abstract

Joint exchange and raiding can emerge in a world of mutual raiding when the appropriated production is less valuable to the appropriator than to the defender and the defense is not too inferior to attack. The amounts of resources allocated to production and raiding and the amounts of goods exchanged reciprocally are determined endogenously. The model reduces to pure exchange and pure raiding as special cases. Pure exchange emerges when the usability of appropriation is sufficiently low. Pure raiding emerges if the defense is sufficiently inferior to attack. The results of the model are intermediate between the results of the two extreme cases. (JEL C6, C72, D51, D72, D74, F10) Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 42 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 572-586
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:42:y:2004:i:4:p:572-586

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Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Caruso, Raul, 2007. "A Tentative Model of Conflict, Appropriation and Production in a two-sector Economy," MPRA Paper 4053, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Hoffmann, Magnus, 2006. "Enforcement of Property Rights in a Barter Economy," MPRA Paper 3260, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

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