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Spesa Pubblica E Criminalità Organizzata In Italia Evidenza Empirica Su Dati Panel Nel Periodo 1997-2003

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Author Info
Caruso, Raul

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Abstract

[ENGLISH]This work presents original results regarding the relationship between economic life and organised crime in Italy. This empirical study is underpinned by some theoretical insights drawn from conflict and rent-seeking theories. Then the paper presents a panel analysis including the twenty Italian regions over the period 1997-2003. The results show that : (a) a significant positive association does exist between investments in real estate sector and the index of organised crime; (b) a significant positive association does exist between public investments and the index of organised crime index; (c) a significant negative association does exist between social protection expenditures and the index of organised crime; (d) a significant negative association does exist between investments in private investments and the index of organised crime. [ITALIAN] In questo lavoro si presentano risultati nuovi inerenti al legame tra sistema economico e criminalità organizzata. Sulla base di alcuni intuizioni teoriche derivate dalle teoria economiche del rent-seeking e dei conflitti, è stata costruita un’analisi panel per le 20 regioni italiane nel periodo 1997-2003. I risultati dell’analisi empirica mostrano che: (a) esiste un’associazione positiva significativa tra gli investimenti nel settore delle costruzioni e l’indice di criminalità organizzata; (b) Esiste una associazione positiva significativa tra gli investimenti della pubblica amministrazione e l’indice di criminalità organizzata; (c) Esiste un’associazione negativa significativa tra la spesa per protezione sociale e l’indice di criminalità organizzata; (d) Esiste un’associazione negativa significativa tra gli investimenti in industria in senso stretto e l’indice di criminalità organizzata.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6861.

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Date of creation: Jan 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6861

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Related research
Keywords: [ENGLISH]organised crime; rent-seeking; conflict; monopoly; panel data; Mafia. [ITALIAN]crimine organizzato; rent-seeking; conflitto; monopolio; panel data; Mafia.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
H39 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Other
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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  6. Kyung Hwan Baik & Shogren, Jason F., 1995. "Contests with spying," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 441-451, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Caruso, Raul, 2007. "Reciprocity in the shadow of Threat," MPRA Paper 1788, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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    Other versions:
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  13. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Baumol, William J, 1990. "Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 893-921, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Syropoulos, C. & Skeperdas, S., 1993. "Gangs as Primitive States," Papers 10-93-25, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
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  20. Cameron, Samuel, 1988. "The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2), pages 301-23.
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  22. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2007. "Contests for Status," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 338-363. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2005. "Contests for Status," Discussion Papers 139, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  24. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.


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