Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Differentials in Property Rights in a two sector-economy

Contents:

Author Info

  • Caruso, Raul

    ()
    (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart)

Abstract

This paper presents a two-sector economy. In a contested sector two agents struggle to appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In an uncontested sector uncontested sector, they hold secure property rights over the production of some goods. Agents split their resource endowment between ‘butter’, ‘guns’ and ‘ice-cream’. The latter denote productive activities secure from appropriation. It is shown how improvements in productivity can countervail destructive impact of continuous conflicts. Eventually, the basic model is extended to consider a government and a rival group. A redistributive government can boost production in the uncontested sector, but at a higher level of ‘guns’.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.europeanpeacescientists.org/2_2012.pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Network of European Peace Scientists in its series NEPS Working Papers with number 2/2012.

as in new window
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 05 Sep 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:nepswp:2012_002

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.europeanpeacescientists.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: property rights; conflict; productive and unproductive Activities; Butter; Guns and Ice-cream; appropriation; entrepreneurship; redistribution; kleptocracy;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
  2. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2005. "Globalization and Domestic Conflict," International Trade 0507005, EconWPA.
  3. Baumol, William J, 1990. "Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 893-921, October.
  4. Raul Caruso, 2004. "A Trade Institution as a Peaceful Institution?," Others 0406003, EconWPA, revised 15 Dec 2004.
  5. Kjell Hausken, 2004. "Mutual Raiding of Production and the Emergence of Exchange," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(4), pages 572-586, October.
  6. Magnus Hoffmann, 2010. "Enforcement of property rights in a barter economy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 249-263, February.
  7. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
  8. Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
  9. Giacomo Luca & Petros Sekeris, 2012. "Land inequality and conflict intensity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 119-135, January.
  10. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
  11. Skaperdas, S., 1991. "Cooperation, Conflict And Power In The Absence Of Property Rights," Papers 90-91-06a, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  12. Anderton, Charles H & Anderton, Roxane A & Carter, John R, 1999. "Economic Activity in the Shadow of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 166-79, January.
  13. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2004. "On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(1), pages 43-68, February.
  14. Raul Caruso, 2010. "Butter, Guns And Ice-Cream Theory And Evidence From Sub-Saharan Africa," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(3), pages 269-283.
  15. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, S.J., 1999. "Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical Investigation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 418, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 03 Aug 2000.
  16. Frederick van der Ploeg, 2008. "Voracious Transformation of a Common Natural Resource into Productive Capital," OxCarre Working Papers 002, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
  17. Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl & Torvik, Ragnar, 2003. "Predator or prey?: Parasitic enterprises in economic development," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 275-294, April.
  18. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:17:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Matthew J. Baker, 2003. "An Equilibrium Conflict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter-Gatherer Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 124-173, February.
  20. Kjell Hausken, 2006. "The Stability Of Anarchy And Breakdown Of Production," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 589-603.
  21. Baland, Jean-Marie & Francois, Patrick, 2000. "Rent-seeking and resource booms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 527-542, April.
  22. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
  23. Raul Caruso, 2007. "Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A note," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(17), pages 1-8.
  24. Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Campiglio, Luigi Pierfranco, 2013. "Famiglia e pressione fiscale
    [Households and tax burden in Italy: 1991-2012]
    ," MPRA Paper 50592, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:nepswp:2012_002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vincenzo Bove).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.