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The Stability Of Anarchy And Breakdown Of Production

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  • Kjell Hausken

Abstract

In Hirshleifer's (1995) model for unitary actors, combined fighting/production abruptly breaks down when inter-group decisiveness of fighting is above a certain value (above one) or income requirements are not met. Accounting for the collective action problem, this article gives the opposite result that fighting/production is stable also for large decisiveness parameters (above one) and strict income requirements for each agent. The stable fighting/production equilibrium gets gradually easier to perturb off balance for high inter-group decisiveness, high costs of fighting, different fighting efficiencies, and equal group sizes. The equilibrium number of groups that can be sustained decreases in the inter-group decisiveness and increases in the cost of fighting.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Defence and Peace Economics.

Volume (Year): 17 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 589-603

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Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:17:y:2006:i:6:p:589-603

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Related research

Keywords: Production; Fighting; Anarchy; Peace; Collective action;

References

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  1. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-34, November.
  2. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. " Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
  3. Harrison, Glenn W & Hirshleifer, Jack, 1989. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 201-25, February.
  4. Herschel I. Grossman, 1998. "Producers and Predators," Working Papers 98-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  5. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1991. "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 130-34, May.
  6. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
  7. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
  8. Hausken, Kjell, 2000. "Migration and intergroup conflict," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 327-331, December.
  9. Hausken, Kjell, 2000. "Cooperation and between-group competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 417-425, July.
  10. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1997. "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropriative Activities," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(253), pages 101-17, February.
  11. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Caruso, Raul, 2012. "Differentials in Property Rights in a two sector-economy," NEPS Working Papers 2/2012, Network of European Peace Scientists.
  2. Powell, Benjamin & Stringham, Edward P., 2008. "Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of Anarchy: A Survey," Working Papers 2008-7, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
  3. Caruso Raul, 2011. "On the Nature of Peace Economics," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-13, January.

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