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Cooperation and between-group competition

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  • Hausken, Kjell

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 42 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 417-425

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:42:y:2000:i:3:p:417-425

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  1. Hausken, Kjell, 1998. "Collective rent seeking and division of labor1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 739-768, November.
  2. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
  3. Horn, H. & Lang, H. & Lundgren, S., 1991. "Managerial Effort Incentives, X-Inefficiency and International Trade," Papers 507, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  4. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
  5. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-34, November.
  6. Hwan Baik, Kyung & Lee, Sanghack, 1997. "Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 121-130, February.
  7. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  8. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. " Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
  9. Hausken, Kjell, 1995. "The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 655-687.
  10. Vickers, John, 1995. "Concepts of Competition," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 1-23, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Dieter Bös, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse27_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
  3. Heinrich Ursprung, 2011. "The Evolution of Sharing Rules in Rent Seeking Contests: Incentives Crowd Out Cooperation," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2011-02, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  4. Jacobsson, Adam, 2005. "War and Peace - Cyclical Phenomena?," Research Papers in Economics 2005:8, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  5. Rafael Reuveny & John W. Maxwell, . "Conflict and Renewable Resources," Working Papers 2004-26, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  6. Dieter Bös, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 807, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden, 2005. "Interest group size dynamics and policymaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 271-303, December.
  8. Sadiraj, V. & Tuinstra, J. & Winden, F. van, 2004. "Interest Group Size Dynamics and Policymaking (extensive revised version of WP 01-03)," CeNDEF Working Papers 04-06, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
  9. Kjell Hausken, 2006. "The Stability Of Anarchy And Breakdown Of Production," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 589-603.
  10. Hausken, Kjell, 2000. "Migration and intergroup conflict," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 327-331, December.

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