Differentials in property Rights in a two-sector economy
AbstractThis paper presents a two-sector economy. In a contested sector two agents struggle to appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In an uncontested sector, they hold secure property rights over the production of some goods. Agents split their resource endowment between ?butter?, ?guns? and ?ice-cream?. The latter denote productive activities secure from appropriation. It is shown how improvements in productivity can countervail destructive impact of continuous conflicts. Eventually, the basic model is extended to consider a government and a rival group. A redistributive government can boost production in the uncontested sector, but at a higher level of ?guns?.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Dalloz in its journal Revue d'économie politique.
Volume (Year): 122 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique.htm
property rights; conflict; productive and unproductive Activities; Butte;
Other versions of this item:
- Caruso, Raul, 2012. "Differentials in Property Rights in a two sector-economy," NEPS Working Papers 2/2012, Network of European Peace Scientists.
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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