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Economic Activity in the Shadow of Conflict

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Author Info
Anderton, Charles H
Anderton, Roxane A
Carter, John R
Abstract

Appropriation possibilities significantly alter economic fundamentals in a production and exchange economy. This is the primary lesson of the authors' model, which combines Ricardian trade and the potential for predator/prey behavior. The model shows how conflict can be subdued by mutual gains from trade but at a resource cost that modifies the exchange itself. On the other hand, it identifies conditions wherein appropriation incentives are so strong that specialized production and trade are precluded altogether. The model also reveals a new way to think about and measure the gains from trade. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 37 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 166-79
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:37:y:1999:i:1:p:166-79

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  2. Rafael Reuveny & John W. Maxwell, . "Conflict and Renewable Resources," Working Papers 2004-26, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  3. Raul Caruso, 2005. "A Very Simple Model of Conflict with Asymmetric Evaluations and Institutional Constraint," Public Economics 0510011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. John W. Maxwell & Rafael Reuveny & Jefferson Davis, 2007. "Dynamic Winner-take-all Conflict," Working Papers 2007-12, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  5. Caruso, Raul, 2006. "Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes,(The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game)," MPRA Paper 214, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Andrea P. Velásquez Guijo, 2008. "The formality in property rights: determinant in the military strategy of armed actors," HiCN Working Papers 39, Households in Conflict Network. [Downloadable!]
  7. Charles Anderton & John Carter, 2004. "Vulnerable Trade: The Dark Side of an Edgeworth Box," Working Papers 0411, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Caruso, Raul, 2007. "Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A Note," MPRA Paper 2316, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  9. John Robst & Solomon Polachek & Yuan-Ching Chang, 2006. "Geographic Proximity, Trade and International Conflict/Cooperation," IZA Discussion Papers 1988, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  10. John W. Maxwell & Rafael Reuveny, 2004. "Continuing Conflict," Working Papers 2004-27, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2001. "Guns, Butter, and Openness: On the Relationship between Security and Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 353-357, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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