Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A Note
AbstractThis note is about the possibility of a stalemate in a continuing conflict. Following the prevailing economic literature on the topic, under some assumptions, the outcome of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a predetermined split of a contested output; (ii) a winner-take-all contest where the winning agent is capable to grab all the contested stake. By contrast, in reality many disputes do not have a clear or a definite outcome. A stalemate can end the conflict with the result of a draw. To allow for a stalemate, some formal modifications to the classical Hirshleifer’s model of conflict are needed. In particular, the possibility of a stalemate can be captured through a modified form of the Contest Success Function as axiomatized by Blavatskyy (2004). Under the possibility of a stalemate, the scenario exhibits a higher level of ‘guns’ than Hirshleifer’s classical model. At the same time, it also exhibits a lower degree of entropy.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2316.
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Conflict; Stalemate; ‘Butter’; ‘Guns’; Hirshleifer; Entropy; Violence;
Other versions of this item:
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-24 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- J. Amegashie, 2006. "A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 135-144, January.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
- Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 201-204.
- Hirshleifer, Jack, 1987. "Economic Behaviour in Adversity," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226342825, September.
- Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September.
- Enrico Spolaore, 2004. "Economic Integration, International Conflict and Political Unions," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 94(5), pages 3-50, September.
- Raul Caruso, 2004. "A Trade Institution as a Peaceful Institution?," Others 0406003, EconWPA, revised 15 Dec 2004.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006.
"Economics of Conflict: An Overview,"
050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2003. "On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within," Public Economics 0312005, EconWPA, revised 04 Mar 2004.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996.
"Contest Success Functions,"
Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
- Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
- Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
- Anderton, Charles H & Anderton, Roxane A & Carter, John R, 1999. "Economic Activity in the Shadow of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 166-79, January.
- Caruso, Raul, 2007. "Conflict and Conflict Managment with Asymmetric Stakes (The Bad-Cop and the Good Cop part II)," MPRA Paper 1438, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Raul Caruso, 2008.
"Reciprocity in the shadow of threat,"
International Review of Economics,
Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 91-111, April.
- Skaperdas, S., 1991.
"Cooperation, Conflict And Power In The Absence Of Property Rights,"
90-91-06a, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September.
- Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 480-94, July.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1991. "The Paradox Of Power," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 177-200, November.
- Caruso, Raul, 2007.
"Recirpcity in the shadow of Threat,"
1788, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Raul Caruso, 2012.
"Differentials in property Rights in a two-sector economy,"
Revue d'économie politique,
Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 257-278.
- Caruso, Raul, 2012. "Differentials in Property Rights in a two sector-economy," NEPS Working Papers 2/2012, Network of European Peace Scientists.
- Caruso Raul, 2011. "On the Nature of Peace Economics," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-13, January.
- Caruso, Raul, 2011. "International Relative Prices and Civil Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. Theory and Evidence over the period (1995-2006)," MPRA Paper 29761, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Caruso, Raul, 2007. "A Tentative Model of Conflict, Appropriation and Production in a two-sector Economy," MPRA Paper 4053, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.