War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside
AbstractThis article presents a new theoretical perspective on the diversionary use of force. Players are partitioned into groups and choose how to allocate their resources to production, fighting against other groups, and fighting internally. The model gives a rationalist explanation of the group cohesion effect: when there is a lot of fighting between groups, there is less internal fighting. In equilibrium, players choose sufficiently high external conflict in order to avoid internal conflict. In contrast with the existing literature, this diversionary use of force takes place even though there is no asymmetric or incomplete information.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Peace Science Society (International) in its journal Conflict Management and Peace Science.
Volume (Year): 28 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://pss.la.psu.edu/
diversion; conflict; group cohesion effect; war;
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- Caruso, Raul, 2011. "International Relative Prices and Civil Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. Theory and Evidence over the period (1995-2006)," MPRA Paper 29761, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- María Cubel & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2014. "Difference-form group contests," Working Papers 2014/6, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
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