Historical evidence suggests that Mafias originally formed to provide enforcement of legitimate property rights when state enforcement was weak. We provide a general equilibrium model of Mafias as enforcement coalitions which protect property from predators. Both the level of predation and the type of enforcement ³ self-enforcement, specialized competitive enforcement and Mafia enforcement ³ are endogenous. We identify the conditions under which a coalition emerges and persists and show that Mafias are most likely to be found at intermediate stages of economic development. We also show that Mafias might provide better enforcement to the rich than would a welfare-maximizing state, suggesting a difficulty in the emergence and persistence of state provision of enforcement.
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Length: 37 pages Date of creation: 25 Oct 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:480
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Find related papers by JEL classification: K0 - Law and Economics - - General H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1993.
"Gangs as Primitive States,"
Papers
92-93-13, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
Other versions:
Syropoulos, C. & Skeperdas, S., 1993.
"Gangs as Primitive States,"
Papers
10-93-25, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1993.
"Gangs as Primitive States,"
Papers
92-93-02, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)