A framework is developed in which the formation of gangs--the criminal market structure--is endogenous. As in standard models of crime, under a given gang structure, an increase in deterrence reduces criminal output. However, under identifiable circumstances, an increase in deterrence can lead to an increase in the number of competing criminal gangs and to an increase in total illegal output, possibly accompanied with a fall in the price. We show that an increase in demand can also modify the criminal market structure and can ultimately affect the output and the price in a similar way. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1993.
"Gangs as Primitive States,"
Papers
92-93-13, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
Other versions:
Syropoulos, C. & Skeperdas, S., 1993.
"Gangs as Primitive States,"
Papers
10-93-25, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1993.
"Gangs as Primitive States,"
Papers
92-93-02, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
Nicolas Marceau & Gordon M. Myers, 2000.
"From Foraging to Agriculture,"
Discussion Papers
dp00-07, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, revised Feb 2000.
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