Previous analyses of arms races and proliferation are integrated and extended, building from a treatment of the behavioral foundations of weapons acquisitions to a general theory of arms races, with implications for the role of negotiations, the balance of power, the timing of crises, and nuclear proliferation. Recent developments in economic theory are also applied here to the problems of the arms race, nuclear proliferation, and the outbreak of war, yielding a deeper treatment of these phenomena by directly or indirectly treating asymmetric information in bargaining, repeated games that involve threats, and principal-agent problems in decisions on technology and weapons accumulation.
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ReDIF This chapter was published in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.) Handbook of Defense Economics, , chapter 06, pages 109-164, 1995.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).
Related research
This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), 1995.
"Handbook of Defense Economics,"
Handbook of Defense Economics,
Elsevier,
edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
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