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The Effects of the Security Environment on Military Expenditures: Pooled Analyses of 165 Countries, 1950-2000

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Author Info
William D. Nordhaus () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
John R. Oneal (Dept. of Political Science, University of Alabama)
Bruce Russett (Dept. of Political Science, Yale University)

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Abstract

Countries' military expenditures differ greatly across both space and time. This study examines the determinants of military spending, with particular reference to the importance of the external security environment. Using the liberal-realist model of international relations, we first estimate the probability that two countries will be involved in a fatal militarized interstate dispute. We then aggregate these ex ante estimates of the likelihood of dyadic conflict, calculating the annual joint probability that a country will be involved in a fatal dispute. This is our measure of the external threat. We then estimate the level of military spending by country and year as a function of the security environment, arms races with foes and the defense expenditures of friendly countries, states' involvement in actual military conflict, economic output, and various other political variables. In analyses of a panel of 165 countries, 1950 to 2000, we find that the security environment is a powerful determinant of military spending. Indeed, our prospectively measured estimate of the external threat is more influential than any of several influences known only ex post. Our best estimate is that a one percentage point rise in the probability of a fatal dispute leads to a 3 percent increase in military spending.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1707.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision: Oct 2009
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1707

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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Related research
Keywords: Military spending; Security threat; Arms race; Militarized disputes; Democracy; Alliances;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jennifer Gandhi & Adam Przeworski, 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation, And Rebellion Under Dictatorships," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 18(1), pages 1-26, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 2007. "Civil War," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Brito, Dagobert L. & Intriligator, Michael D., 1995. "Arms races and proliferation," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 109-164 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Dunne, J. Paul & Smith, Ron P., 2007. "The Econometrics of Military Arms Races," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Murdoch, James C. & Sandler, Todd, 1984. "Complementarity, free riding, and the military expenditures of NATO allies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 83-101, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-12.


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