The Assignment of Powers in Federal and Unitary States
AbstractThis paper studies a model where the power to set policy (a choice of project) may be assigned to central or regional government via either a federal or unitary referendum (constitutional rule, CR). The benefit of central provision is an economy of scale, while the cost is political inefficiency. The relationship between federal and unitary CRs is characterized in the asymptotic case as the number of regions becomes large, under the assumption that the median project benefit in any region is a random draw from a fixed distribution, G.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 569.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
DECENTRALIZATION ; GOVERNMENT ; REFERENDUM;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
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- Ana María Iregui, 2002.
"Decentralised Provision Of Quasi-Private Goods: The Case Of Colombia,"
BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA
002251, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
- Iregui, Ana Maria, 2005. "Decentralised provision of quasi-private goods: The case of Colombia," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 683-706, July.
- Ana María Iregui, . "Decentralised Provision of Quasi- Private Goods: The Case of Colombia," Borradores de Economia 203, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
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