In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote

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In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote

Author Info

Crémer, Jacques
Palfrey, Thomas

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Jacques Crémer

Abstract

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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 33.

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Date of creation: 1994
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Publication status: Published in European Economic Review, vol. 40, 1996, p. 43-60.
Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:4558

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Article
- Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1996. "In or out?: Centralization by majority vote," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 43-60, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Cremer, J. & Palfrey, T.R., 1994. "In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote," Papers 94.335, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., . "In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote," Working Papers 879, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Hendriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 729, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jean Hindriks & Benjamin Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- HINDRIKS, Jean & LOCKWOOD, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare," CORE Discussion Papers 2005046, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
- Jean Hindriks & Ben Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," Working Papers 2006-02, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
- Hindricks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 5125, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Jean, HINDRIKS & Ben, Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation and Vote Welfare," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2005038, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
- Hindriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2009. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 385-397, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gradstein, Mark, 2000. "The Political Economy of Sustainable Federations," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Michele Ruta, 2003. "The allocation of competencies in an international union: a positive analysis," Working Paper Series 220, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
John William Hatfield & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2009. "A Political Economy Theory of Partial Decentralization," NBER Working Papers 14628, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jon X. Eguia, 2006. "United We Vote," Working Papers 2006.9, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Economy Perspective," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 721, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Kjetil Bjorvatn & Alexander Cappelen, 2003. "Decentralization and the Fate of Minorities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Eguia, Jon X., 2004. "United We Vote," Working Papers 1208, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Pani, Marco & Perroni, Carlo, 1999. "Time-Inconsistent Candidates vs. Time-Inconsistent Voters : Imperfect Policy Commitment in Political Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 544, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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