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Electricity and telecoms reforms in the EU: Insights from the economics of federalism

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  • Trillas, Francesc

    ()
    (IESE Business School)

Abstract

The economics of federalism is a broad discipline with more than five decades of experience. It may shed light on how regulatory jurisdiction is allocated in EU electricity and telecommunications markets. Specifically, this paper assesses the evolution of reform up to and including the third EU packages, which continue the liberalization and integration process in these markets. Liberalization has been accompanied by gradual harmonization of national markets to overcome resistance to competitive forces. Less steps than necessary have been undertaken to promote market integration; yet, positive and normative reasons remain for the participation of national or even regional/local powers. Vertical institutional cooperation will remain a necessary condition for a sound regulatory framework, but cooperation may sometimes be inhibited by distributive considerations.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by IESE Business School in its series IESE Research Papers with number D/861.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 07 May 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0861

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Postal: IESE Business School, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN
Web page: http://www.iese.edu/
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Keywords: federalism; regulation; electricity; telecommunications;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Erdogdu, Erkan, 2010. "Electricity Market Reform: Lessons for developing countries," MPRA Paper 27317, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. John J. García & Francesc Trillas, 2013. "European energy industry shocks, corporate control and firms' value," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO CIEF, UNIVERSIDAD EAFIT 010928, UNIVERSIDAD EAFIT.
  3. Carlo Andrea Bollino & Davide Ciferri & Paolo Polinori, 2013. "Integration and convergence in European electricity markets," Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia, Finanza e Statistica, Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia, Finanza e Statistica 114/2013, Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia, Finanza e Statistica.
  4. John J. García and Francesc Trillas, 2012. "Regulatory Reform and Corporate Control in European Energy Industries," RSCAS Working Papers, European University Institute 2012/30, European University Institute.
  5. Clifton, Judith & Diaz Fuentes, Daniel & Revuelta, Julio, 2013. "Financing Utilities: How the Role of the European Investment Bank shifted from regional development to making markets," MPRA Paper 51011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Erdogdu, Erkan, 2013. "Essays on Electricity Market Reforms: A Cross-Country Applied Approach," MPRA Paper 47139, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Wolfgang Kerber & Julia Wendel, 2014. "Regulation of Network Sectors in the EU: A Federalist Perspective," MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) 201422, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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