Utility price regulation and time inconsistency: comparisons with monetary policy
AbstractWe examine the hold-up problem of price regulation and compare it with the monetary policy credibility problem. For both, reputational solutions are possible provided that the policymaker is sufficiently far-sighted, but the hold-up problem in regulation turns out to be more serious than the inflation bias problem in monetary policy. Even with far-sighted regulators, a reputational equilibrium with optimal investment is undermined if capital depreciates slowly and consumer demand increases slowly. These results make the Rogoff-delegation solution to the regulatory commitment problem especially attractive. The paper concludes with a short discussion linking these results to the empirical literature on utility regulatory regimes. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 57 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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